Introduction to Bacon & the Art of Living

The story of bacon is set in the late 1800s and early 1900s when most of the important developments in bacon took place. The plotline takes place in the 2000s with each character referring to a real person and actual events. The theme is a kind of “steampunk” where modern mannerisms, speech, clothes and practices are superimposed on a historical setting.  Modern people interact with old historical figures with all the historical and cultural bias that goes with this. What follows is a continuation of my quest to understand bacon curing and the art of living. As such, I change gears in this chapter slightly by focusing on the “art of living.” In the story, I am writing as an old man from the 1960, but in reality, I address matters right up into the 2020s.

The Life and Times of Jan W Kok

October 1960

Introduction

Over the years I have written letters to my kids telling them what I learn and about my experiences. They followed my quest to produce the best bacon on earth through these monthly communications. When I returned home I found that they kept every letter. Over the years they moved on with life and now reside in other parts of the world. When they were here last December to visit, they gave me the draft of a book where they are including every letter. They even contacted Dawie and Oscar, who both sent them my letters. They asked me to write the introduction to every county and the “Union Letters,” as they called the letters I sent them from Cape Town.

I asked them if I could add three accounts of companies who achieved perfection in the large-scale production of bacon. The first of the three examples of people who achieved high standards in bacon production is Chapter 13.01: The Castlemaine Bacon Company.

In that chapter, I juxtapose the Anglo Boer War experience of Wright Harris, an Australian who fought for England in this war and who founded the Castlemaine Bacon Company after the war, with the experience of my great grandfather, Jan Kok who fought on the side of the Boers and whose great-grandson, being myself, established his own bacon company in Woodys Consumer Brands in Cape Town which is a major subject in this work.

One of the biggest lessons I learned from the art of bacon curing is to be true to myself. Bacon curing follows natural processes focused on the particular kind of protein in muscle meat namely myoglobin and its interaction with nitrogen and oxygen atoms through nitric oxide. Understanding the inherent nature of bacon allows us to properly evaluate for health and nutrition. In exactly the same way grounding ourselves in life is predicated upon understanding our own essential nature.

When I looked at the life and times of Jan Kok, I discovered that participation in the war was by no means a consensus decision nor was the fierce opposition to England something universally shared amongst the Boers. The image of what a Boer is comes with a fair amount of historical baggage, but the question comes up if it is the only image of a Boere? Besides this, I discovered that events at the Branswater Basin “seems to have been airbrushed from history” (Ash, 2018) by the Nationalist Government. It became imperative for me to find the true historical context and to place the surrender of Jan Kok within this context. Besides this, did Jan fit the stereotypical image handed down to me of a Boer? Like the events at the Brandwater Basin, the myth of the Boer has been firmly established by much the same propaganda machine. I have read many accounts of the war in English, American and Australian newspapers where journalists clearly romanticised the war and talked the evil villains up, in those cases being the Boers, that I can not only lay the blame for the myth that sprang up at the feet of the Nationalists propaganda machine. It is clear, however, that much of the Boer image is based on myth. I was keen to discover the “real” Jan Kok!

I grew up with the story of my great grandfather, Jan Kok, who was captured at the Brandwater Basin while fighting for the Boer republic of the Orange Free State. While studying the life and times of Jan Kok for the Castlemain chapter, a complex picture emerged which must be recognised to be just as much the picture of a Boer or Afrikaner as the well known stereotypical picture. I have been at pains to point out in the two transition chapters from my life as a Transport Rider to a Bacon Curer in Chapter 05: Seeds of War and Chapter 06: Drums of Despair, that there is no single image that fits all Boers as it is true for the English and all the other peoples of Africa but I was thrilled to see a new historic picture of a Boer emerging from my own family!

One of the main thrusts of my article is, therefore, that the evidence from the Anglo Boer War shows a wide array of political positions towards the war, characterised by two extremes. On the one hand, the pro-British-Boer who openly collaborated with the enemy and on the other extreme, the hard-line pro-War-Boer who saw any cooperation with the British as treason. Evidence shows that many Burgers found themselves somewhere in the middle and for a variety of reasons closer to one of the two extreme positions. The evidence further indicates that their relative position to the extremes changed during the course of the war and it is impossible to say that any particular position is a reflection of what some refer to as a “true Boer” or “true Afrikaner.” The conclusion I came to was that in the end, a thoroughly pragmatic consideration of the world we live in is the only sensible way to evaluate the present and the past. To go on a crusade about the dangers of nitrite is not the best way to deal with the matter of nitrite in meat curing. Likewise, to worship romanticised mental images of anything, including what it means to be a Boer is foolishness! All matters must thoroughly be grounded in reality!

The Case to Be Considered

When I talk about a stereotypical view of a Boer, a few aspects must be highlighted. One is a hatred for the English and the second is disrespect for black people. A view that they are inherently subservient to the white man and “shall never cease being slaves, both hewers of wood and drawers of water” (Josh 9:3). Thirdly, according to this view, a true Boer or a true Afrikaner would have given unequivocal support to the Anglo-Boer War and anybody questioning this, in any shape or form, was seen as a traitor. In terms of their faith, the true Boer is a strict Calvinist-Protestant. They will speak Afrikaans or at the very least, Dutch. They are single-minded (hardkoppig) and yield to none but to God.

The question is if this picture is a true reflection of the Boer of the late 1800s and early 1900s who fought the Boer War. Let me give the conclusion right up front that the picture of the Boer who fought the Boer War was far from the stereotypical view. Many, if not most were somewhere on the continuum which I described.

The evidence seems, for example, that not everybody was in support of the war, especially not those Boers who had the most to lose. Or, we can say it like this – many Boers initially supported the war, but when it became clear that the odds of success were almost non-existent, many Boers started preparing themselves for life after the war in a variety of ways – some more honourable than the other. When I say this, I realise that my judgement becomes highly subjective for what is the measure of “honourable”!

For example, many opted to actively seek peace and to start negotiations for a future, sooner rather than later, while others opted to openly collude with the enemy. For me, there is a distinction and the litmus test is two-fold. On the one hand, I would ask if the actions endangered the lives of others and on the other hand, I would ask if you were honest and open about your intentions. Those who openly colluded with the enemy in war is problematic to me. That would be unacceptable (a subjective judgement on my side, I know). Others simply chose to stop fighting which I would argue is a perfectly legitimate response when the situation is so dire that there is no point in fighting any further or, alternatively, if you can no longer support the war, then getting out of the way to allow those who still believe in it do what they see is the right course of action, will be, in my mind, a legitimate response. If you are an officer, I would at least expect you to resign your position.

It’s a lot more complicated than this since the kommando law and other laws of the land comes into play and then there are international conventions, treaties and agreements to factor in, but to me, these very subjective two criteria would be important. Men like De Bruin who I quote and refer to throughout this discussion will find my simplistic position amusing. He is after all a respected Advocate and masterfully deals with the subject in strictly legal terms. My position is simplistic, subjective and personal but I give it without apology exactly because important and weighty decisions are made in reality by ordinary citizens based on such subjective and simplistic arguments in every sphere of life. It is exactly this kind of reasoning which may have been entertained by some of the ordinary burger who, like me had no formal training in matters of law, nor did they have access to even a fraction of the information I had privy to in writing the article. Parents and leaders in all spheres of life had to use devices from their field of reference to make sense of a complex and chaotic situation and who can blame them that they got it wrong in many instances?

Such a device which I will employ come from my own background and I will use it throughout the article namely that of a simple continuum with two extremes on either end. The one is a pro-English position of collusion and the other is a had-line Boer position that supports continued fighting. I will argue that most Boers were somewhere on the continuum between the two extremes. My metaphor breaks down because it does not account for the moral dilemma of when the action impacts negatively on the lives of others which is my test if a course of action is morally justified or not. In this situation, I could however not think of a simple model which would deal with the full scope of complexity in the arguments. Still, I choose to retain it since it shows that positions are never static. Our minds change in terms of where we stand on a subject as different facts come to light or forces influence us; as circumstances change. So, if we plot the two extremes on a line, the one end being completely unacceptable and the other very acceptable, my point is that certain options become more palatable than the other. In terms of the strict legal position, what I present will not fly, but, it nevertheless puts it in terms that I can relate to.

It is extremely important to recognise that at some point, even the actions of the hardliners crossed a moral line that became untenable when pride and ego became the commodity that was being paid for by the blood of young Boer fighters. Maybe the two extremes must be to fight on the one end and not to fight on the other. To continue fighting may become morally so unacceptable that military collaboration with the enemy becomes justified. If the actions of your own people become so destructive and detrimental to the cause that they become the enemy, I would say that switching sides becomes a justified option.

Apart from relying heavily on family recollection and documentation, the background information comes to us mainly through the work of Boje & Pretorius (2011) and the recollections of Gen De Wet. In the Further Reading section at the end of the article, I list the work of Chris Ash, Boer surrender at the Brandwater Basin. Chris is by no means a fan of De Wet and is particularly scathing in his criticism of what transpired at Brandwater. I recommend that you read it, not because I agree with everything he says, but because there is nothing like an irreverent person with a completely opposing view to open one’s eyes to what was probably really happening. It strips away cultural biases and allows one to look more closely at the facts. He represents the “devil’s advocate” position very well and if one ever embarks on a critical evaluation of any matter, the devils-advocate-method is an extremely useful tool! If you want to stress-test any position, look for people who disagree with you and hear them out! It will serve you very well in any evaluation!

I am eager to get to know Jan Kok in his surroundings, with the good, the bad and the ugly so that I can see who he was, not just on his own but within the context of the life and times when he lived!

The Brandwater Basin Story As I Had It

Jan W Kok leaves their farm, Kransdrif on 5 May 1900 at 20:00 in the evening in the Windburg District. A letter we have from JW Kok to his mom dated 12 December 1899 (1 and 3) from Ladysmith must have been a letter from Jan Kok’s father whom we know joined in Nov 1899 and we know his kommando took part in the Natal campaign at the start of the war.

The Windburg Kommando was divided in two. This is seen from the fact that they served both in Natal and on the Western front. Jan Kok (Snr.) mentions his service in Moderrivier and Magersfontein but we know they were also in action in Natal. This will be consistent with the letter sent by JW Kok (Snr) from Ladysmith. At the Western front, J.P.J. Jordaan acted as temporary Kommandant in charge. Jordaan was captured at Paardeberg with the surrender of Cronjé. Kommandant Jan Kok from the Winburg kommando was also elected as temporary Kommandant. Like Jordaan, he was also captured at the surrender of Cronjé. (De Bruin)

Jan rode to the farm of A. Nel, Kafferskop. In all, there were 11 people riding together; 6 from Winburg, 1 from Kroonstad, 2 from Thabanchu and two black people. They travel to Ficksburg, where they join the Kommando, and on 18 May they set off from Ficksburg to join larger Boer forces (3). This was possibly the same force that found itself in the Brandwater area.

It was in the Branwater basin where Jan Kok surrendered to the English and his participation in the Anglo Boer War effectively ended. On 28 July, he notes in his diary that the kommando, under the leadership of General Martinus Prinsloo, decides that it is not worth fighting any further since the Boers are heavily demoralised. They ask the British to negotiate a surrender. At this time they are still in Fouriesburg, in the Brandwater Basin.

The formal surrender was on 30 July 1900. Jan and his fellow Boers laid down arms on 31 July. They are assured by the British that they would be allowed to return to their homes and farms, but in the end, this does not materialise. Jan writes in his diary on Monday, 31 July 1900: “We have our weapons deposited on the surrender of General Prinsloo to General Hunter. On this day he notes, “a time of new experiences and disappointment, for sure.”

This is then the version I grew up with and which was told many times around dinner tables in our family! 

Re-Visiting Brandwater: What Happened in early 1900?

Great was my surprise when I realised that there was much, much more to the story! I turned to the account of events at the Brandwater Basin from the perspective of the leader of the Boer forces in the Boer Republic of the Orange Free State, Gen Christiaan Rudolf De Wet. He devoted an entire chapter in his book, Three Years’ War (1903), to events that unfolded here. Boje & Pretorius (2011) gives key background information which puts the Brandwater saga in perspective. I rely on their work extensively together with that of De Wet. Before we focus on Brandwater, let’s first look at the actual timeline of the war during the early parts of the year 1900 to get some insight into what the mental state of the burgers must have been.

General Cronjé, commanding the western theatre of war, surrendered on 27 February at Paardeberg. We will see that Jan Kok’s father, also Jan Kok was part of this surrender. On 28 February Bullers troops marched on Ladysmith. At this point, Christiaan de Wet was appointed as commander-in-chief of the Orange Free State and in its defence, he gathered his commandos at Poplar Grove, 16km from Paardeberg and on the way to Bloemfontein. The Boer forces were in disarray and when they saw the cavalry at a distance, they fled. On 10 March the Battle of Driefontein took place. Under Christiaan de Wet, the Boer forces were holding the 11 km line covering the approach to Bloemfontein. Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly-Kenny under orders from Lord Roberts attack the Boer position from the front. Lieutenant General Charles Tucker’s attached its left flank. The Boers were forced to withdraw and Bloemfontein fell.

In early April British forces destroyed the Foreign Legion fighting with the Boers when they were en route to attack British forces at Boshof. On 25 April the battle of Israel’s Poort near Bloemfontein took place where the Canadians secured a victory against the Boers. The surrender of Cronjé on 27 February 1900 and the fall of Bloemfontein on 13 March 1900 resulted in a massive loss of morale amongst the Orange Free State burgers. Thousands deserted and many laid down arms. They hoped that the war would be over soon and more than that, they could not see how the Boers could be victorious. There is good evidence that suggests that what they were hoping for was that another country would intervene on their behalf, but it became clear that it was not going to materialise. The people who laid down arms were referred to as hensoppers (from the English, hands up) and the ones who both laid down arms and joined the English war effort were referred to as “joiners.” It is estimated that between 12 000 and 14 000 burgers laid down arms between March and June 1900. This makes it around 16% of the total combined strength of the Free State and Transvaal army which is estimated to have been around 88 000 (Britannica) when it was on its highest. (Blake, 2016)

The question of Jan Kok’s commitment to the war must therefore be seen in the light of the fact that he joined amidst a wholesale level of desertion among the Boers and when the prospect of success was lower than ever! He joins exactly 6 days after his dad surrendered under Cronje, on 5 May from their farm Karnsdrift. The reason why he joined on this day is clear from his diary: “On 5 May the English invaded Windburg.” He writes that their farm was very busy that day with different kommandos trekking past the farm. We prepared ourselves to join. That evening we left home at 8:00.” No matter how low the morale, the war had come to them!

Re-Visiting Brandwater: Introducing Key Players

The fact is that so many men laid down arms and that this speaks about very low morale, should not be underestimated. Not just did the rank-and-file soldier lose confidence, but so did many of the leaders. As background, we will consider three of them who plaid pivotal roles in the Brandwater saga. The three men obviously represent countless others who had similar stories. These are critical backstories to our investigation. The first one we look at is Harry Theunissen.

Harry Theunissen and Marthinus Prinsloo

Helgaard Marthinus (Harry) Theunissen is the first man we meet. He hails from Windburg, the same town where the Kok family lived. Theunissen “was a prominent and wealthy member of the Winburg community. He owned a number of farms and was the manager of the Jagersfontein Diamond Mine.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011) I knew Jagersfontein well on account of my Grandparents on my Dad’s side living in Fauresmith.

“Theunissen was elected to the Winburg church council in 1897 and became a field cornet and justice of the peace in 1889. On the outbreak of war, Theunissen went to the Natal front as field-cornet of the Winburg ward. When Marthinus Prinsloo, who was commandant of the Winburg commando, was chosen as Chief Commandant of the Free State forces on 9 October 1899, Theunissen took over as commandant.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011) Prinsloo, together with de Wet would be the two main characters in the Brandwater Basin saga. Jan Kok, his parents and family would have known both Theunissen and Prinsloo well. Jan’s dad writes in his war diary that he corresponded with Theunissen. He also knew Prinsloo personally and served under him during his time on commando during the Basotho wars. In his Short Autobiography: Johannes Willem Kok gives the following story of him and Prinsloo.

Jan’s dad writes that during the Basotho wars it happened once that he was on kommando for months without a warm jacket to protect him against the rain and the cold. He says that he had a good commandant at this time. He recalls how a heavy rainstorm overtook them. The Kommandant saw him sitting in front of his horse and quickly came over and he held his own coat over Jan’s dad to protect him. The Kommandant in question was Marthinus Prinsloo. Jan’s dad then mentions that Prinsloo made no distinction between rich and poor. He was a remarkable leader. Jan’s dad is an eyewitness of Prinsloo’s first appointment as Boer officer. He recalled “He mentions Jan Fick who was the general from Ficksburg. When he resigned the people from Windburg elected Marthinus Prinsloo in his place. Jans dad describes him as very young but one who had the courage of a hero. In battle, he cared for his men. He was friendly and strict. His commans had to be obeyed and as kommandant- general of the kommando from Boshoff, the krygsraad elected him to head the Bloemfontein komaando. (Short Autobiography: Johannes Willem Kok)

In Natal, it appears that Theunissen did not impress on the battlefield. “The Winburgers made a poor showing on the occasion of the assault on Platrand (5-6 January 1900). J.D. Kestell, who was attached to the Harrismith commando as chaplain and was present at the battle, accused them of having failed their compatriots by lurking at the base of the hill they were supposed to attack. This passivity is confirmed by Anna Barry’s account. She says that Jan de Villiers, field cornet of Senekal, and his men were able to watch it all from their positions on the slope. In his account of the battle, Johannes Hendrik Labuschagne of Harrismith also held the Winburgers to blame. The Dutch writer Louwrens Penning omits any mention of them, but comments significantly that the lack of cooperation between the commandos was never more painfully felt than in the attack on Platrand.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

During the battle of Paardeberg, he was captured and sent to Green point’s POW camp. Interestingly, this means that he fought with Jan W. Kok’s father who also fought at Paardenberg and was also sent to Green Point. “As a prisoner of war at the Green Point P.O.W. camp, Theunissen was elected camp commandant. It is an accepted military convention that an officer performs this role without incurring blame. In this capacity, he presided over a court that dealt with criminal offences affecting the prisoner community. Ironically, prosecutions in the camp court were in the name of ‘the State’. However, Theunissen’s position was not unambiguous, as we can see from the fact that in November 1900 he frustrated an escape attempt by prisoners of war by reporting it to the military authorities. In 1901, Theunissen became involved in the peace movement. He met with Sir Hamilton Goold-Adams, the newly appointed Deputy Administrator of the Orange River Colony, in January of that year, and with the peace envoys, Christiaan Laurens Botha and Piet de Wet, a month later. He was lauded by the British authorities for his pro-British role in the Green Point and later the Simonstown camp.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

“After the war, at a time when other Boer leaders were lying low, Theunissen had no difficulty in cooperating with the British authorities. An example of this is the appointment of a school committee for the Winburg district. Rev. J. Marquard, the moderator of the Dutch Reformed Church in the Free State, and Frederik (Frikkie) Cronjé, the last commandant of the Winburg commando, declined the appointment, but Theunissen served with the Methodist minister George Henry Jacques, the merchant Edward Thomas Dobinson and the bank manager John Garden representing Winburg; Jacobus Lourens Lategan of Wynandsfontein, who was never on commando, Major A. Lyon of Kareefontein and Cecil Gerhardus van Heyningen of Leeuwarden, who had been assistant superintendent of the Winburg concentration camp, for Smaldeel, and Dr Esaias Reinier Snyman and Peter Kahts, who had also not been on commando, for Ventersburg.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

This certainly indicates a wide array of political positions towards the war to be characterised by two extremes namely the pro-British Boer who openly collaborated with the enemy and the hard-line pro-War-Boer who saw any cooperation with the British as treason. That many Boers found themselves somewhere in the middle is clear and their relative position shifted at times is equally consistent with the evidence. As such, “the stance Theunissen adopted did not affect the esteem in which he was held within the Boer community, as is evident from his continued service on the Winburg church council.” The hardliners of today would have us believe that any affiliation with such a man would be unthinkable, but here we have clear historical proof to the contrary and my suspicion is that either many of them did the same kind of thing, had similar views or a bit of both. It seems to have been understood that a Boer would find himself or herself somewhere in the middle of the two extreme positions.

Theunissen was “the leading proponent of the establishment of a separate congregation at Smaldeel. In 1909 he was the chairman, and Van Heyningen the secretary, of a meeting at Smaldeel, which led, in time, to the implementation of this project. On 19 May 1910, a separate congregation was finally achieved and the first church council of four elders and eight deacons was elected, including Helgaard Theunissen and at least three other members whose wartime activities were, shall we say, suspect. In 1915, in the wake of a rebellion led by irreconcilables from the Anglo-Boer War, Theunissen was appointed to the office of church elder. In tandem with the striving for a separate congregation, moves were also afoot for the proclamation of a new township based on the Smaldeel siding. In this matter too, Theunissen was a key player. On 13 September 1907, the new town was proclaimed and was named Theunissen in his honour.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

It is very interesting that one of Jan’s brothers was a member of the Theunissen congregation. Jan W Kok’s first wife, Kotie Kok passed away on 5 January 1938. She was with her son, Tom, and in the article below it is stated that he was from the Theunissen congregation. Kotie’s full names were Jacoba Johanna Elizabeth Theron. She was born on 04 February 1855 and passed away on the farm Wynandsfontein, Theunissen.

From the photo posted of his grave on BoerenBrit, it seems to me that he passed away in 1945, aged 85. The enhanced photo I created is posted below. That being the case, it means that Theunissen was 78 when Kotie passed away and when we know that Tom was part of the same congregation. Having served in the war with Tom’s father and having been in the same POW camp, I am sure that Tom and Theunissen knew each other well. This fact proves nothing except that the families knew each other. What is interesting for me is that the Kok family was definitely no stranger to a robust discussion about the merits of the war and the relationship between Boer and Brit, long before the time of Botha and Smuts as national leaders.

Fanie Vilonel

Another of the One of the key figures in the Brandwater Basin is Fanie Vilonel. “Before the war, Stephanus Gerhardus (Fanie) Vilonel was a law agent and auctioneer and served as town clerk of Senekal. As an educated and wealthy man and, moreover, an incomparable marksman, who won the Free State championships held in Senekal in 1893, it is not surprising that he was elected field-cornet of Winburg’s Onder Wittebergen ward. On 3 October 1899, the 600 men under his command assembled in the Senekal church before setting off for the Natal border.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011) This means that he served with Jan’s dad.

“When the Winburg and Senekal commandos were recalled from Natal, Vilonel fell under the command of Christiaan de Wet. After the attempt to retake Oskoppies, in which Helgaard Theunissen was captured, De Wet had enough confidence in Vilonel to appoint him as commandant of the Winburg commando. He distinguished himself as a brave, capable and respected leader who inspired his men to give their best at the battle of Abrahamskraal. On 25 March 1900, the burghers returned from the leave they had been granted following the fall of Bloemfontein. From their meeting place on the Sand River, Christiaan de Wet moved south with 1 500 men and seven guns. Somewhere between Winburg and Brandfort, he fell out with Vilonel, whose Winburg commando was accompanied by about thirty wagons, in spite of the krygsraad decision of just a week before that commandos should no longer be thus encumbered. De Wet informed Vilonel in writing that the wagons must be sent home, whereupon Vilonel demanded in writing that the krygsraad decision should be reconsidered. He also insisted that De Wet’s decision to attack Sannaspos should be delayed until he had the opportunity of reconnoitring the positions assigned to his men. De Wet offered Vilonel the choice of resignation or dismissal and summarily appointed Gert Stephanus van der Merwe in his place.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

“Perhaps the clash with De Wet had more to do with the chemistry between the two men, one a rough and irascible countryman, the other an urbane and sophisticated townsman, than with Vilonel’s wagons. The fact of the matter is that Vilonel had fought well, but after the fall of Bloemfontein, he clearly lost faith in the war.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011) The fact that people are able to judge the trajectory of a matter and change one approach based on the expected outcome is a sign of intelligence instead of a vice. It shows that positions changed on the continuum between the two extremes of Openly Pro-British and active cooperation on the one hand and hard-line Pro Boer on the other. Without connecting any moral judgement to this, it is a fact of life. People change as circumstances change. Whether this was a productive approach in a time of war is to be debated. As a leader, it is expected of you to continually be interacting with new data.

“When General A.I. de Villiers was severely wounded at the battle of Biddulphsberg on 29 May 1900, Vilonel offered to take him to Senekal for medical attention. Here Vilonel entered into negotiations with the British and it was agreed that should he surrender, he could remain in the town on parole. For the present, however, Vilonel returned to the commandos and when De Villiers died, he was offered the vacant position of combat general. Vilonel declined on the grounds that he had decided to surrender and this he did in the second week of June 1900. He subsequently justified his decision to surrender on the grounds that ‘our independence was hopelessly lost, … and that it was absolute folly to continue the struggle, as it would only lead to total destruction of private property and ultimate destitution.’” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011) I have the highest respect for his actions thus far! He did not hide his intentions and many Boers were equally open about their position on the war which was definitely not all in favour of it! We must also admit that continued prosperity is a powerful motivation and his assertion that ultimate destruction must be prevented, certainly included an attempt to safeguard the infrastructure of the Free State from being destroyed completely. Anybody who has ever been in an armed conflict knows that his argument is not without merit.

“Shortly after surrendering, Vilonel wrote to Field-Cornet Hans van Rooyen of the Korannaberg ward of the Ladybrand commando, seeking to persuade him to surrender with his men. Vilonel’s letter was intercepted and in a sting operation, he was captured and brought to trial. He was not arraigned before a krygsraad at Zuringkrans because it was feared that certain officers who were present there had already negotiated with the enemy in the vicinity of Ficksburg.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

“The trial took place at Reitz before Judge J.B.M. Hertzog and two assessors, Thomas Philip Brain and Johan Godfried Luyt. Vilonel was sentenced to five years imprisonment with hard labour, the judge remarking that he was fortunate to escape a death sentence. On 11 July 1900, Vilonel’s appeal was heard at Fouriesburg by the full bench of Hertzog as acting chief justice and Frederik Reinhardt (Frikkie) Cronjé and Hendrik Hugo as acting judges (Chief Justice Melius de Villiers and Judge Hendri Stuart having surrendered when Bloemfontein fell), with J.A.J. de Villiers prosecuting. Vilonel asked that the trial be postponed until after the war to enable him to retain legal counsel but when this was refused, he conducted his own defence, insisting that he had acted throughout according to the dictates of his conscience. In upholding his previous sentence, Hertzog asserted that the name of S. J. Vilonel would remain an eternal blot on the history of the Free State.”

This was then how Vilonel came to be present in the Brandwater basin with the Government. “Following the fall of Bethlehem, the Boers no longer had any prisons, so Vilonel was made to accompany the commandos into the Brandwater Basin where he was employed by Prinsloo to negotiate the Boer surrender to General Hunter.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011) This allowed him to contribute, no doubt, materially to events in Brandwater.

“At a meeting chaired by Meyer de Kock, a surrendered burgher of Belfast, Transvaal, the establishment of a Burgher Peace Committee was proposed. Before the end of December 1900, a central Burgher Peace Committee was established in Pretoria, and six local committees were in place in the Transvaal by end of January 1901. The same pattern was followed in the Free State. In December 1900, a main committee was set up in Kroonstad under Piet de Wet, brother of Christiaan de Wet, with subcommittees in Bloemfontein, Harrismith, Bethlehem and Winburg. The Winburg committee, which was chaired by George John Perry of Oatlands, consisted of H.S. Viljoen (erstwhile member of the Volksraad for Wittebergen, Bethlehem district), J.C. Pretorius, P.N. van der Merwe, and D.C. Botha, Frans Alwyn Smit Schimper of Bresler’s Flat, Stephanus Gerhardus Vilonel of Senekal, Stephanus Petrus Erasmus Jacobs of Rietfontein and James Adendorff of Smaldeel” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011).

“In January 1902, Vilonel wrote to President Steyn threatening active intervention: If you wish to proceed with the needless continuance of a devastating war, which can only result in the total decline and destruction of your own people, making ex-burghers of both Republics into hewers of wood and drawers of water, you will be the cause that I and other ex-officers and burghers take up arms against you in civil war, to thus accelerating the end. Soon afterwards he began to give effect to this threat. On 18 February 1902, Vilonel wrote from Bloemfontein to the (British) Military Secretary in Pretoria: ‘I have started to bring my men together here. Should I not be able to raise a force sufficiently strong to take the field, I will suggest the best method to follow.’ He assembled more than 300 men and the Orange River Colony Volunteers, an armed and uniformed unit of the British army, corresponding to the National Scouts in the Transvaal, was established. There was a division under Piet de Wet at Heilbron and another under Vilonel at Winburg. By the end of the war, the numbers had grown to 448 – 248 at Heilbron and 220 at Winburg. These formations were of little use to the British on the battlefield but they played an important role as scouts and guides and they sapped Boer morale. In a skirmish on 18 April 1902, a number of members of the Orange River Colony Volunteers were captured at Spitskop near present-day Marquard, Vilonel himself escaping only because of the speed of his mount.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011) The fact that Vilonel was no coward is clear! He acted upon the conviction of his heart and communicated his position with clarity and firmness. He showed himself to be a man prepared to take action to bring the best results about as he and others whom he trusted saw it.

“When peace was restored, Vilonel’s abilities as a law agent and auctioneer stood him in good stead. His law firm handled scores of claims for compensation submitted to the Central Judicial Commission (CJC). Deaths during the war led to the subdivision of farms between the heirs and the necessary re-registration of title. The non-viability of units resulting from such subdivision, lack of liquidity and the foreclosure of mortgages unpaid during the war meant that farms or portions of farms had to be sold off. With an eye to the main chance, Vilonel took out options on 3 000 morgen (2 500 hectares) of farmland at 30 shillings per morgen, with a view to resale to the Commission for Volunteer Repatriation at £2 per morgen.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

“In September 1902, Senekal got a board of management, comprising Oliver Edwards, Herman Opperman, Joseph Busschau, Robert Barnes and Charles Parker. Vilonel, who became mayor in the following year, served on the council without interruption until his death in 1918.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

Gerrie van der Merwe

“As has been shown, Gert Stephanus (Gerrie) van der Merwe was a Senekal field-cornet, ‘a courageous and amiable man’, who was appointed as commandant of the Winburg commando by De Wet when Vilonel was forced to resign the position. He was subsequently elected commandant of the Senekal commando.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

“At Jammersberg, the new commandant was involved in a shoot-out with Major A.W.C. Booth of the Northumberland Fusiliers, in which his adversary was killed and Van der Merwe himself severely wounded. His command passed to Hendrik Lodewyk Willem (Henri) Cremer of Leeuwkuil, but Cremer died in battle less than a month later. Van der Merwe, who had recovered, resumed the rank of commandant.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011) This then takes us to Brandwater where Van der Merwe was still commandant of the Winburg commando.

Re-Visiting Brandwater: From the Perspective of De Wet, Van der Merwe and Vilonel

Here for the sake of chronology, we pick up the narrative from De Wet. After Bethlehem fell, the English needed a rest. General Macdonald came up from the Transvaal. The Boers retreated behind the Roodebergen and De Wet feared total destruction. Only the Roodebergen separated them from the English. “The Roodebergen is a vast chain of mountains, extending from the Caledon River on the Basuto frontier to Slabbertsnek, then stretching away to Witzeshoek, where it again touches Basutoland. The passes over this wild mountain range are Commandonek, Witnek, Slabbertsnek, Retiefsnek, Naauwpoort and Witzeshoek. These are almost the only places where the mountains can be crossed by vehicles or horses; and, moreover, there are long stretches where they are impassable even to pedestrians. It is plain enough, therefore, that nothing would have pleased the English more than for us to have remained behind the Roodebergen.” (De Wet, 1903)

Jan Kok was part of this Boer Force under the leadership of De Wet with the Free State Government and around 4000 Free State Burgers. Vilonel also found himself among the Burgers as a prisoner.

That the Boer fighters faced a formidable foe is certain. De Wet’s own prognosis was dire! He says, “I could see that, in all probability, we must before long be annihilated by the immense forces of the enemy….” He later commented that the English must have been thinking that if those Free-Staters try to make a stand there, it will be the last stand they will ever make.” In his estimation, the “English would have been quite right. To have stayed where we then were would, without doubt, have been the end of us.” (De Wet, 1903)

As a result, the decision was made to break out. A small watch would remain but for the rest, the commando would be divided into three parts. De Wet himself would be the supreme commander of the first division which was to march under the orders of General Botha. “It consisted of burghers from Heilbron, under Commandant Steenekamp, and of Kroonstad men, under Commandant Van Aard. Besides these, there were also five hundred men from Bethlehem, under Commandant Michael Prinsloo.” (De Wet, 1903)

“Besides these, the burghers from Boshof was under Veldtcornet Badenhorst; a small number of Colonials from Griqualand, under Vice-Commandant Van Zyl; and some Potchefstroom burghers, who happened to be with them.” (De Wet, 1903)  I give the detail of the forces and the escape plan to show how the entire Orange Free State was well represented. I also wish to showcase the detailed plans developed by De Wet. It is impressive and despite criticism by some, his plans were evaluated by others who concurred that he had a high probability of success provided that the execution was done well. The Boer force had a good chance to get away from the English. What de Wet, in my opinion, did not have was the depth of leadership required to execute the plan.

“The second division was entrusted to Assistant Commander-in-Chief Paul Roux, with P.J. Fourie and C.C. Froneman as Vechtgeneraals.” Paul Hendrik Roux was the 37-year old Minister of the Dutch Reformed Church at Senekal. His appointment is not as sinister as many suggest. Paul Roux had drawn attention to himself and while serving in Natal by making useful suggestions about the organization of the forces and by his devotion to the wounded. Events about to unfold would show that a few good suggestions are no gauge for a man to take control of such a force against an experienced English general. The second division was “composed of burghers from Fauresmith, under Commandant Visser; from Bloemfontein, under Commandant Du Plooij; from Wepener, under Commandant Roux; from Smithfield, under Commandant Potgieter; from Thaba’Nchu, under Commandant J.H. Olivier; from Jacobsdal, under Commandant H. Pretorius; and of the Deetje Bloemfontein commando, under Commandant Kolbe.” “This force was to wait until the day after De Wets departure, that is, until the 16th, and then proceed in the evening in the direction of Bloemfontein. From the capital, it was to go south, and during its advance, it was to bring back to the commandos all those burghers in the southern districts who had remained behind.” (De Wet, 1903)

“General Crowther was given the command over the third division, which consisted of the burghers from Ficksburg, under Commandant P. De Villiers; from Ladybrand, under Commandant Ferreira; from Winburg, under Commandant Sarel Harebroek; and from Senekal, under Commandant Van der Merve. This division was to start on the 16th, and marching to the north of Bethlehem was to continue advancing in that direction until it fell in with the commandos from Harrismith and Vrede under Commander-in-Chief Hattingh. It would then operate, under his directions, in the north-eastern districts.” The remainder of Commandant Michal Prinsloo’s Bethlehem men—that is to say, the burghers of Wittebergen—were to stay behind as a watch, and to take orders from Marthinus Prinsloo.” (De Wet, 1903)

“This watch was divided into three sections: the first to occupy a position at Slabbertsnek, the second at Retiefsnek, and the third at Naauwpoort. They were forbidden to use waggons; thus if the enemy should appear in overwhelming numbers, it would always be possible for them to escape across the mountains.” The escape plan was developed and orders were in place.” De Wet reason for “selecting these men in preference to others, was that they belonged to the district, and thus were well acquainted with every foot of this rough and difficult country. Their duties were simply to protect the large numbers of cattle which we had driven on to the mountains, and he anticipated that there would be no difficulty about this, for now, that all our commandos had left those parts, the English would not think it worthwhile to send a large force against a mere handful of watchers.” (De Wet, 1903)  Thus everything was settled, and on the 15th of July De Wet set out through Slabbertsnek, expecting that the other generals would follow him, conformably to his orders and the known wishes of the Government.”

De Wet set out on July the 15th in the direction of Kroonstad-Heilbron, the Free State Government accompanying him. His well-laid plan was, however, not what transpired. A combination of quick and decisive moves from the Engish, poor leadership and, as we have seen from the background studies, Boer leaders probably already contemplating not continuing the war all ended up in a catastrophe for the Boers. A fair amount of chaos ensued as the English forces moved against the Boers.

Prinsloo saw the hopelessness of the situation and sent an offer to Hunter for an armistice to consider surrender which Hunter refused. There is some disagreement in the chronology which follows, but irrespective, the end result is the same. An election was called among the Boer officers to elect a new commander in chief in the place of Roux. Prinsloo was elected as leader in the place of Roux. Three candidates were present of equal rank being Prinsloo, Roux and Olivier. A meeting was held to choose a commander and Mr Marthinus Prinsloo was chosen as the Assistant Commander-in-Chief. The election was in keeping with Boer tradition up till this time to choose their leaders by vote and not by proclamation from the supreme commander or the president. Prinsloo’s authority to surrender is a contentious and debated issue and “assistant Commander-in-Chief Roux, expressed the wish that another meeting should be held and a new Assistant Commander-in-Chief elected.” De Wet laments the fact that Roux caved in to the appointment of Prinsloo. He writes, “Even then, all would have gone well if Roux had only stood firm.” (De Wet, 1903)

De Wet writes that Prinsloo “had a bare majority even at the actual meeting, and several officers, who had been unable to be present, had still to record their votes. Not only, therefore, had Prinsloo been elected irregularly, but his election, such as it was, could only be considered as provisional. Nevertheless, for the moment, power was in his hands.” (De Wet, 1903) Prinsloo did not immediately surrender even though this may have been his intention all along.

Marthinus Prinsloo was previously the commandant of the Winburg commando and later Chief Commandant of the Free State forces. He knew the Kok family well as we have seen. De Wet states that “on the 17th and 18th of July the enemy had broken through at Slabbertsnek and Retiefsnek, causing the greatest confusion among our forces.” He correctly offers this by way of explaining the state of mind and the chaos that ensued in the ranks of the Freestaters. It has been reported that some burgers were in the depths of despair, and some of the bravest and sturdiest were to be seen shedding tears of rage. Each man went on his own way, with nobody to give him orders. The one crying need was for a man to lead this flock. Even Roux, who seems to have been wandering about aimlessly among these men, had nothing better to do than to complain of the number of wagons with the Boers, and to lament that there was nobody in chief command…. (Ash, C) The meeting where Prinsloo was chosen in the place of Roux took place on the 17th. Fifty-Six Percent of the officers and men present at the meeting where Prinsloo was chosen also voted in favour of immediate surrender. It was the same assembly which, in defiance of the law, elected Mr Prinsloo as Commander-in-Chief who then moved to vote for surrender. “The vote was seventeen for surrender and thirteen to continue fighting.” (De Wet, 1903)

The Boers of the Free State had by this time completely lost their appetite for war! Studying these matters carefully caused me to ask another question. What would I have voted? Since the war, it became anathema to even ask the question, but the reality of what transpired on that day sank in, I asked soul searching questions! It seems to me then that given the right circumstances, every Boer in the Free State opted to collaborate with the English at some level even if that “level” was to stop fighting and get out of the way for those who still have an appetite for war. What else does it mean to surrender? How can we then judge those who opted to not to fight or those who individually approached the English with the harshest of criticism?

The events leading up to Prinsloo’s surrender is beautifully described by Jan who was an eyewitness of this monumental event. It clearly shows that the surrender was not optional despite De Wets views. With compatriots, Jan hastens himself to Fouriesburg which temporarily served as the capital of the Freestate. He is assigned to guard General Prinsloo. He writes, “The night was bitterly cold. We slept in small groups behind the houses. Our group slept behind the house where Gen. Prinsloo stayed with his family.

The General must have received word of a night offensive by the Engish to capture Fouriesburg and he immediately moved out. Jan writes “We boiled out kettle in the house and at 2:00 the general woke us and we saddled our horses and we departed to a hill situated in the direction of the sunrise. We dismounted at the mill of Le Harp. We gave our horses fodder and we prepared some food for ourselves. The way I understood it was that the English were in Fouriesburg at first light.”

Jan and his compatriots were eager to engage the English. He writes that “when we saddled our horses our acting commander and his brother stopped us from returning to the English. We continued on and stayed on the farm of Mnr M. Heyns for a few days.” The English were in hot pursuit and he writes that on 28 July “we had to abandon our position.”

“The English engaged us with canons and we took new positions after about half an hours riding. The morning began violently. Our gunner could not return fire as he was pinned down under English fire. A short while after this, the attack with rifles started and continued to nightfall. Two of our men were wounded and one was killed. At this time we were very hungry. We were instructed to abandon our positions and move further. We were at this point not far from the kraal and we pressed on to Naupoort where we spent the night. The commandant and field marshal summoned us to a meeting and informed us that further resistance was futile. The field marshal was very stern and told us that the men were tired and negotiations would follow to surrender. When we left the meeting we sang Song (Gesang) 65:1. He instructed us to take our positions. A report was sent to the English General to inform him of our plans. The English officers and our officers met to negotiate. The English General insisted that the surrender had to be unconditional. Many Boers made sure that they could get to Naupoort on this day. We were completely surrounded by the English. The officers agreed to the total surrender and thought that we would be allowed to return to our homes and personal property. We, however, got away from all this with absolutely nothing (completely naked).” (JW Kok War Diary) Jan was 20 years old when this happened.

On 28 July Jan notes in his diary that the commando, under the leadership of General Marthinus Prinsloo, decides that it is not worth fighting any further since the Boers are heavily demoralised. They ask the British to negotiate a surrender.

The formal surrender happened on 30 July 1900, but Jan and his fellow Boers laid down arms on 31 July. On Monday 31 July 1900. Jan writes: “We have our weapons deposited on the surrender of General Prinsloo to General Hunter.” On this day he notes, “a time of new experiences and disappointment, for sure.” This way, the English captured almost the entire fighting force of the Free State.

Something very important is that De Wet states that “it was still possible for the commandos to retire in the direction of Oldenburg or of Witzeshoek.” (De Wet, 1903) Indeed, there were a handful of Boers who escaped and continued with the war but the overwhelming majority did not. Of the over 40% who voted against surrender, only a tiny minority actually escaped and continued fighting.  Having voted for or against surrender, the overwhelming majority actually surrendered, despite having had the opportunity to escape. There is, of course, the matter of how the English would have dealt with those who did not honour the surrender and we will see shortly how this weighed on the minds of the leaders. In any event, even considering this as a motivating factor for escape or surrender means that you are already making choices based on the English and their view of your actions. Were these in a way already negotiating their options with the English? I would argue, yes!

De Wet writes that “it was on July the 29th, 1900, that Prinsloo, with all the burghers on the mountains, surrendered unconditionally to the enemy.” (De Wet, 1903) The surrendered forces comprised of “4 000 men with their arms and ammunition, their commissariat livestock and other supplies.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011) De Wet was furious. He writes that “the circumstances of this surrender were so suspicious, that it is hard to acquit the man who was responsible for it of a definite act of treachery; and the case against him is all the more grave from the fact that Vilonel, who was at that time serving a term of imprisonment for high treason, had a share in the transaction.” Prinsloo used Vilonel to negotiate the Boer surrender to General Hunter. (Boje & Pretorius, 2011) The fact that the supreme Boer Commander in the Free State left such a large force under the command of men with questionable loyalties and experience must elicit serious questions.

On 30 July the news was made public that Marthinus Prinsloo, the new Chief Commandant, had offered General Hunter the unconditional surrender of the Boer forces in the Basin. (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

De Wet lists the men involved in the surrender. “Prinsloo‘s surrender included General Crowther, Commandants Paul De Villiers, Ferreira, Joubert, Du Plooij, Potgieter, Crowther, Gerrie Van der Merve, and Roux; and about three thousand men.” The fact that Roux surrendered is of interest. This was, in all likelihood the same Ds Roux who would later in the POW camp preach to the young men there and blame them for having surrendered! His role was clearly pivotal in his inability to lead when it mattered most!

Boje and Pretorius (2011) give further information on Van der Merwe and Roux’s conduct and their state of mind are on display. “Sobbing like a child, Commandant Gerrie van der Merwe thanked the Senekallers for their loyal service and laid down his office, protesting that Prinsloo’s action, by which he felt himself bound, was unsanctioned by a krygsraad. After him, apparently, Paul Roux, the rival Chief Commandant, got on the wagon and, with tears rolling down his cheeks, told his burghers that they had been sold out.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011) I see the movement of positions along the line that links the two extreme positions I am developing of being pro-British on the one hand and hard-line Pro-War on the other. I clearly see another matter at play which I was first alerted to by a friend in the Magaliesburg region when, referring to the difference between General De Wet and his brother, he pointed out to me that some men allow their heads to rule and some allow their emotions. The actions of Van der Merwe and Roux, which I believe was determined by their thinking, did not negate their emotions. They did what they believed was the right course of action, despite their emotional desire to continue fighting. Still, Roux’s inability to lead and De Wets trust in a man of such little military experience with such a daunting task lay blame before both men in equal measure.

What exactly the role was in the surrender by Van der Merwe is an interesting question. From the above, it seems as if he did not support it or, at the very least, was conflicted about it. What I do not appreciate, is that once a decision is made where thinking prevails, at least have the courage of your conviction to stick to that decision!

Van der Merwe offers the following very sad explanation for his actions. He said that he wondered if he “had the right to escape.” His own account of his actions reads as follows: “Although I was at first firmly resolved to escape, I thought that as the Senekal commando, which fell under Winburg, had also been surrendered, I would get into trouble if I did not surrender” In negotiating his chances with the English, I believe one can not fault him. Many surrendered! Not just in the Brandwater Basin. Boje & Pretorius quote him further when Van der Merwe says, “I was afraid that if the enemy subsequently caught me, they would deport me for seven or eight years. Apart from that, there was no longer much chance of escape as we were virtually surrounded. I was also fairly dispirited. Yet if I had known that I had the right to escape, I would probably have tried to do so. At first, I refused to surrender but later I did it on the advice of Generals Roux and Crowther.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)The fact that Roux encouraged him to escape is very interesting and speaks to the emotional and mental struggle of Roux at this time. In Van der Merwe’s mind, right or wrong, he was negotiating with the enemy and exploring which option would have the best consequences for him. He was moving along the line of being a collaborator with the English and being a hard-liner Pro-Boer based on what was the most expedient option for him personally. Not just Van der Merwe did this – most of the burgers in the Orange Free State did!

“In contrast to Van der Merwe’s view that there was little chance of escape, General Archibald Hunter expressed surprise that the Boers ever thought of surrendering as, in his view, their military situation did not justify it.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011) This may be so if the Boers had the disciplined leadership that Hunter was used to as a career soldier! His comments are in my opinion a bit naive as to the leadership situation in the Boer camp of which he could not have detailed insight.

“Lieutenant Gerrit Bolding, a Dutch volunteer with the Free State forces, found it disturbing that although the terms of the (unconditional) surrender were circulated among the officers on Sunday evening 29 July, the Senekal burghers believed to the last that they were going home, and not only the ordinary burghers but Lieutenant Keulemans, who was in charge of one of the guns. If some of the men thought they were going home, that may be regarded as mere folly. But it is impossible to assume folly in the case of Lieutenant Keulemans, who informed me on the Monday morning that everyone would be allowed to go home. Was this treachery on the part of the Senekal commandant, Van der Merwe? I cannot believe it of him.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011 (Boje & Pretorius, 2011) This promise of “going home” is a matter that warrants further investigation. Jan W Kok also believed he was about to be released to go home. Later in the POW camp, Jan reported that Roux accused them of surrendering because they were homesick. In other words, they were promised they would go home. They surrendered because they wanted to go home – that was the promise. This promise was definitely more widely circulated than only the Senekal burgers. We will look closer to this belief of the Burgers when we consider Proclamation III in the next section.

It is reported that there were many stories going about in the Boer camp while the decision was being contemplated to surrender or not. Still, the fact that the rank-and-file soldier was enticed with the offer shows that they too were prepared to work with the English and to choose the option that would be in their own personal best interest at that time. The fact that Ds Roux was the one accusing them later of surrendering on the basis of their personal needs was hypocritical! Who was the man in charge in the most legitimate sense of the word and did he not surrender himself?

De Wet further address the issue which I also raise namely that despite the vote against surrender was over 40%, when it came down to it, the vote-by-action was overwhelmingly against a continuation of war and in favour of surrender. De Wet observes that “the most melancholy circumstance about the whole affair was that, when the surrender was made, some of the burghers had reached the farm of Salamon Raath, and were thus as good as free, and yet had to ride back, and to go with the others to lay down their arms.” (De Wet, 1903) He is right and this is the reason why I say that at that point, given the number of men, being a well-represented group of people from the Freestate, it is fair to say that everybody in the Freestate would probably have done the same if they were in their shoes. To one of my main points, the De Wet-image of a Boer represented a minority position. Most Boers were not the never-give-in, pro-war hardliners! Most of the Boers, the overwhelming majority were moderate, thinking people who did not allow their hearts to rule their minds!

De Wet speaks to the question whether the burghers could claim that they only followed orders. He believes this not to be the case. “Even the burghers themselves cannot be held to have been altogether without guilt, though they can justly plead that they were only obeying orders,” De Wet writes. “A large number of burghers from Harrismith and a small part of the Vrede commando, although they had already made good their escape, rode quietly from their farms into Harrismith, and there surrendered to General Sir Hector Macdonald.” (De Wet, 1903)

The fiasco at Brandwater seems to be a matter that comes down to a serious lack of leadership from men like Van der Merwe and Roux and in light of this, the average Boer supported the only logical alternative namely surrender. Proper leadership came, in my opinion from men like Prinsloo and Vilonel on the other side of the spectrum, who acted decisively and exactly in accordance with their conscience.

The careful planning of De Wet must also be questioned. The leaders acted upon their evaluation that the situation was hopeless. At least at this junction, there in the Brandwater Basin and with the prospect of total annihilation looming. The fact that so many leaders were actively participating with the British before Brandwater and were trying to position themselves for a future under English rule did not help the situation but it was also not inconsistent in terms of how everybody, in the end, voted! The descriptions of the tearful pleas by leaders to the Burgers; the fact that they were themselves torn between continuing to fight and surrender – it all points to an internal struggle they had to pin their exact location along the continuum we have developed with the cooperation with the British as the one extreme and undying loyalty to the Boer couse of freedom and independance on the other extreme. It was a battle between their minds and their hearts. Some had the struggle even before the battle began, but De Wet who must have been aware of the leadership challenges left the 4000 or so men under the leadership of people with questionable ability and conflicting loyalties and for this De Wet alone must be blamed. Whether he had many options in the matter is, of course, a completely different question.

De Wet mentions that despite everything, some did escape. He writes, “those who escaped were but few. Of all our large forces, there were only Generals Froneman, Fourie and De Villiers (of Harrismith); Commandants Hasebroek, Olivier, Visser, Kolbe, and a few others; a small number of burghers, and six or seven guns, that did not fall into the hands of the English.” (De Wet, 1903) It is extremely instructive that escape was in actuality possible and by far, the overwhelming majority of the approximately 4000 burghers chose not to. Without dealing with the detail here, the Boiers who escaped did not make it very far.

Roux and Van der Merwe’s involvement at the surrender must be looked at very carefully. De Wet’s criticism of Roux, that he acted like a child, is irrefutable; his behaviour was weak, indecisive and petulant. The other side of the coin, as I just said, is why De Wet entrusted this enormous task to a DRC Minister is a good question. Maybe he simply chose the best man he had available. Boje & Pretorius reports that “Archibald Hunter confessed he found it oddly equivocal. Roux refused to send after the burghers who were escaping from the basin to advise them to abide by Prinsloo’s surrender because ‘[h]e said he himself felt bound by Prinsloo’s action but did not think the same applied to his men. I fail to follow his argument.’ According to J.N. Brink, it was not only Prinsloo who entered into negotiations with the British; other officers did so without the knowledge of Roux. A.P.J. van Rensburg is emphatic that Roux himself was involved” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011) which is my exact point. This was the general Boer position. Not the fanatical hardliner!

No matter how one look at it, the surrender was not simply the work of a hand full of Free State Leaders and only confined to the officers. It seems to have been a well-supported action by both the leaders and the burghers, albeit it being done with tears and great personal anguish and with diminished responsibility for the rank-and-file burgers.

The Surrender

The actual surrender was later described in dramatic terms. Iain Hayter shared the following description with me along with the drawing above. “On the morning of 30 July 1900, General Hunter received the surrender of Generals Prinsloo and Crowther and of the Ficksburg and Ladybrand commandos. The surrender took place on what would become known as ‘Surrender Hill’, a long and high, almost flat-topped hill on what is today the farm Coerland, which adjoins Damascus Farm and Verliesfontein (ironically meaning ‘loss fountain’). A more magnificent or dramatic setting for a formal surrender could hardly be imagined and it was there that General Hunter had established his headquarters. The Scots Guards, the Munster Fusiliers and the Royal Irish were formed up as a guard of honour to receive the Boers. General Paget was also present with mounted troops and a few of Brabant’s Horse. The artillery took up a position on the right of the guard of honour and the Union Jack was unfurled. The bands of the Scots Guards and the other two regiments played alternately while awaiting the arrival of the burghers.”

The following is the scene as described by F C Moffett in his book With the Eighth Division: ‘The first prominent Boers to appear were Prinsloo, De Villiers and Crowther – fine-looking men; they were preceded by Sir Godfrey and Lady Lagden, from Basutoland, who had come to witness the final scene. Then followed the commandos, who threw down their arms and ammunition with a certain effect of swagger in front of the guns. The whole scene was most romantic . . . In the background were huge mountain masses standing out in the clear morning air, and from these came the various commandos winding down the steep mountain paths to the valley below. They were a motley lot – old and young men – some mere boys; all had two horses each at least, but many had three, the spare ones being used for baggage, which consisted of pots, pans, bedding, blankets, etc. There were a considerable number of natives among them, all of whom were mounted, though scantily clad. A huge number of wagons and Cape-carts followed, in which were many women, the wives of the burghers.

Proclamation III of 1900

It is clear that there has been a general belief amongst the Burgers on the day of surrender that they would be sent home. Jan Kok says that he maintained that belief till the time when he got to Windburg and reality only dawned on him the following day when comrades were being loaded onto train trucks for transport to Cape Town. What was happening here? De Bruin deals masterfully with the background.

By March 1900 large parts of the Free State were under British occupation. The supreme command of the British forces issued Proclamation III of 1900 on 15 March 1900 in order to persuade Free State Burgers eligible for military service to stay out of the war.

According to this proclamation, burgers eligible for military service who did not contribute materially to the war effort of the Free State and/ or who did not command any of the military forces of the Free State and/ or who have not convicted property of a British citizen and committed no act of violence against such a British citizen was permitted to withdraw from the war effort of the Orange Free State without being taken POW by the British forces. In order to utilize this arrangement, people eligible for war duty had to apply for a pass and they had to swear an oath. The oath involved a commitment not to join the war effort.

It is very important to differentiate here that neither officers nor soldiers in active service were eligible for this and as such, the burgers who surrendered at the Brandwater Basin did not qualify. POW’s were naturally excluded. In the Free State, every male between the age of 16 and 60 was eligible for war duty. Irrespective of the arrangement by the British, the Free State Government was free to prosecute such men who did not report for millilitre service based on Proclamation III. The Free State Government responded to the proclamation of the British with two proclamations of its own which emphasized the fact that an agreement with the enemy did not mean that the law of the Free State did not apply to the burger and that no citizens had a valid excuse for not participating based on a proclamation made by the enemy (III of 1900).

This sets the entire matter of the belief of the burgets that they would be allowed to go home in the context of the broader war and proclamations and counter proclamations by the Free State Government and the English respectively.

What Happened to Van der Merwe?

We were still discussing Van der Merwe, when we started following the chronology of events as soon as he found himself in the Brandwater Basin with De Wet. What happened to him is of equal importance to the development of my argument.

“Van der Merwe went as a prisoner of war to the Green Point camp. Captivity provided the British with the opportunity of systematically suborning their more influential prisoners. From the diarist Rocco de Villiers we know that all captured officers were invited to meet with officers of the British Intelligence Department. De Villiers’s experience of being plied with whisky and soda, cigarettes and friendly persuasion may well have been standard procedure. Green Point was the primary clearinghouse, with prisoners either going from there to Simonstown or rejoining their families in the concentration camps or being deported. Between February 1901 and the beginning of July, 1 564 prisoners of war were returned from Green Point to the Free State – 202 of them to the Winburg district.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011) Jan Kok also went through Green Point but instead of being returned to the Free State and the Windburg district, in particular, he was sent to Durban, on route to Ceylon.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

“On 8 January 1901, Van der Merwe was sent with other officers from Green Point to Simonstown, from where he returned on 19 March 1901. In Simonstown, he attended a meeting addressed by the peace envoys, Christiaan Laurens Botha and Piet de Wet. On 22 March, Jacob de Villiers noted in his diary: ‘Comdt. J.P. van der Merwe has gone to Bloemfontein-camp where his wife is.’” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

“Van der Merwe’s confirmation of this date occurs in an affidavit dated 30 May 1901 that he submitted in an attempt to have missing cattle restored to him. In this, he reveals that ‘I was taken as P.O.W. to Green Point and was kept there until the 20th of March 1901, when I was sent on parole to the Refugee Camp, Bloemfontein, for a certain political purpose.’ And this, in turn, is confirmed by the instruction authorising his release from captivity in Green Point and the notification, dated 10 March 1901, of his being paroled to Bloemfontein along with other peace delegates. He signed the oath of allegiance in the Bloemfontein concentration camp, where he joined his wife Cornelia Rosina and their four children. ” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

“After the war, the Van der Merwe returned to their farm, Kookfontein, and started rebuilding their lives. On 9 February 1903, a meeting for the election of church councillors took place in Senekal. In a noteworthy address, Rev. Paul Roux, who had been a Boer general during the war, laid down the criteria for selection. He urged his hearers to distinguish between political and ecclesiastical matters, saying that a good Christian should not be denied election to the church council for political reasons.’ This is remarkable because it contrasts so strikingly with the implacable attitude he adopted at the Free State synod, which opened on 30 April, when he insisted not only on confession of guilt but also on ‘the exposure of iniquities that have been committed.’ It is equally remarkable for its decisive foreclosing of the whole issue of collaboration in relation to church council membership.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

“There was no contention about such membership until 26 November 1904, when it came to light that two women, the wives of David du Buisson and Jan Malan, had objected to the election of ex-Commandant van der Merwe as a deacon. Only Elizabeth Maria du Buisson of the farm Tafelberg appeared before the council and testified that during the war she had seen Van der Merwe in the presence of British troops. Gerrie van der Merwe did not deny being seen in the company of British soldiers but asked her if she knew why he was there. The chairman then asked her to admit that the Boers had spies among the British. Next, he read a letter from Christiaan de Wet, vouching for Van der Merwe’s integrity and saying he was convinced that his presence with British troops indicated that he was planning to escape. Mrs du Buisson remained unconvinced. Pressed to withdraw her objection, she declined and declared that she would refrain from taking communion if Van der Merwe was confirmed in office. She was asked if she desired the evidence of witnesses to Van der Merwe’s innocence, but replied, ‘No, because one can’t believe anybody.’ The church council unanimously concluded that there was no evidence whatever of disloyalty on Van der Merwe’s part and that his own statement and De Wet’s letter demonstrated that his presence with a British column had a totally different purpose from that imputed to him. They accordingly ratified his election.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

“Reading the minutes it is hard to escape the impression that Mrs du Buisson was not given a fair hearing. Perhaps her fellow protestor failed to attend the meeting precisely because she feared the sort of badgering Du Buisson received. Gerrie van der Merwe’s only answer to the charge was to ask the witness if she knew why he was with a British column, without himself offering any credible explanation. The chairman, Paul Roux, pressed her to admit the existence of Boer spies, without categorically claiming that Van der Merwe was one. De Wet’s suggestion – again no categorical claim – that an escape was being planned is absurd in the circumstances of a prisoner of war detained in Green Point being seen with British troops in the Free State. And if the charge against Van der Merwe was preposterous, why, one wonders, was Roux armed with a letter from De Wet?” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

“If Roux knew of Van der Merwe’s involvement in ‘a certain political purpose’, it is still necessary to ask why he sheltered him. They were, of course, old comrades in arms. More than that, though, their involvement at the time of Prinsloo’s surrender was not unproblematic – and perhaps not blameless either. De Wet’s criticism of Roux, that he acted like a child, is irrefutable; his behaviour was weak, indecisive and petulant. Archibald Hunter confessed he found it oddly equivocal. Roux refused to send after the burghers who were escaping from the basin to advise them to abide by Prinsloo’s surrender because ‘[h]e said he himself felt bound by Prinsloo’s action but did not think the same applied to his men. I fail to follow his argument.’ According to J.N. Brink, it was not only Prinsloo who entered into negotiations with the British; other officers did so without the knowledge of Roux. A.P.J. van Rensburg is emphatic that Roux himself was involved.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

“As one peruses the church council minutes of the period, another impression begins to obtrude itself and that is that larger forces were at play. It is as if, in the Winburg district, at any rate, there was an awareness that the problem of collaboration was so vast and so sensitive that it might be best to let sleeping dogs lie. The church dealt with cases with which it was confronted but was clearly reluctant to seek out offenders. In contrast to adultery, which figured prominently in the council minutes, we hear little of ‘political’ offences. Occasionally there were complaints about neighbours who would not reconcile, for example, Commandant J.M. Maree and W.J. Kok of Hattinghskraal in the Winburg congregation; L.F.E. Erasmus of Harmonie and F.H. Bekker of Witpan in Ventersburg; and A.S. Eksteen of Deelkop and F.P. Senekal of Brakfontein in Senekal.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

“Generally, a commission was appointed to deal expeditiously with such cases but sometimes they just trailed off into oblivion. In general, though, ‘they [the collaborators] just carried on as usual, living among their fellow citizens as though nothing had happened.’ A striking demonstration of the church’s greater willingness to confront sexual issues than wartime collaboration is provided by the case of Oloff Bergh, who during the war had commanded a black corps, officered by Boers, that served on the British side.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

On 16 July 1904, Bergh sought admission to church membership (aanneming) for his wife. The Senekal church council responded that although this could happen, her presentation to the congregation (voorstelling) would have to be deferred for a year in order that the matter of her having had a child within a month of her marriage could be addressed. At the same time, Bergh would be required to submit his certificate of church membership so that ecclesiastical censure could be imposed on him in this regard. It was reported that Oloff Bergh was ‘willing to submit to church discipline and, with regard to his wife’s confirmation, to abide by the wishes of the church council’, and nothing more was heard of the matter.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

The situation reminds me in a way of Germany post-WW II when it became in everybody’s best interest to “move on”.

What Happened to the Collaborators in Windburg?

“At this stage, we may venture an answer to the question posed in the introduction, ‘What happened to collaborators in the Winburg district?’ In the case of Gerrie van Wyk, his actions were covered up; in the case of Fanie Vilonel, he achieved commercial success and was prominent in civic affairs; in the case of Harry Theunissen, he had a town named after him. These are extreme cases, representing the ‘gold’ of the Winburg community, but even for ordinary folk, the ‘iron’, the answer is still: ‘Nothing much.’” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

“Hermanus Gerhardus Pretorius of Cyferfontein, writing a letter from Diyatalawa P.O.W. camp, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), to his brother Johannes Christiaan Pretorius in the Winburg concentration camp, adopts an almost apologetic tone: “Dear Jan, I hope and trust that you will not hold it against me that I did not listen to you when you have always been right in the past. It was bitter for me to be here and even more bitter to bid my country and my people farewell, but at the end that is what I had to do. But let us forgive and forget what is past and try to work for progress in the future since you are free and I am only too glad that you have not had to endure a protracted exile in such a sad manner as I have.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

“He did what he had to do, but he goes on to ask his brother to use his privileged position to acquire livestock to secure a better future. As this brother was a wealthy Ficksburg farmer who, in March 1901, became secretary of Winburg’s Burgher Peace Committee, he was well placed to make provision for the future.” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

“After the conclusion of peace, August Schulenburg contemplated the prospect of being reunited with his brothers and wrote in his diary: “How will the meeting with my brothers be? Our fate is so very different, they are free while I am a prisoner; they are on the side of the English, I on our side! Yet I know that we have all suffered severely and no one knows which of us chose the right road, so I don’t mind how I am received. For my part, I will be happy to meet them again and will love them as much as before …” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

“Apart from the actual ties of kinship between the people of a particular locality, the quasi-kinship of people who used family terms as a form of address also inhibited retaliatory actions. Local ties were stronger than national ties and, on the ground, the simple fact is that people needed one another. There is a poignant moment in Chris Schoeman’s Boer Boy when the Winburger Philip du Preez of Wonderkop is returning to his devastated farm after the war. Overtaken by nightfall, he reluctantly turns to his neighbour, Flip Koekemoer of Rondehoek, a collaborator during the war, for hospitality, and is received by Koekemoer and his wife with warmth and generosity. Du Preez’s own involvement in the war was minimal, but he stood higher in the hierarchy of esteem than Koekemoer, and thus, in the midst of muddle and ambiguity, ‘hendsoppers’ might help to bridge the gap between ‘bittereinders’ and ‘joiners.’” (Boje & Pretorius, 2011)

The Impact of DP de Wet and what the President Knew

From the discussion above it may look like Widnburg, Senekal, Theunissisn and Ficksburg were breeding grounds of dissidents who had as a goal to undermine the war efforts of the Orange Free State. These men’s actions must be seen against a broad movement to bring about peace and the name of P. D. de Wet looms large in this regard. De Bruin deals very well with the broad brush strokes related P. D. to De Wet. I translate from his work.

In May 1900 P. D (Piet) de Wet, brother of C. R. de Wet and commander of a military unit, initiated negotiations with the British forces regarding his own surrender as well as the military unit under his command. The conditions were that he would not be taken as a POW and sent away but that he would be allowed to return to his farm. P.D. de Wet was at this junction one of the commanders of the Orange Free State’s supreme commanders and did not qualify for the exception as contained in Proclamation III of 1900. This proclamation is important in terms of the belief that burgers had that they would be allowed to return home. Over the months to come I will explain what this means and the impact it had on the burgers. (De Bruin)

The British supreme command rejected Piet de Wets request. At this time, P. D. de Wet issued an armistice to the British forces. The purpose of this is not clear. According to Brink, the purpose of the armistice was to engage the Free State government regarding the continuation of the war. P. D. de Wet stated himself that he issued a written communication at this time to the state president where he asked him to negotiate peace. According to him, he pointed out to the state president that succession of hostilities was better and would spare the country an accompanying devastating war. This situation was in all likelihood discussed at the meeting (krysgvergadering) of 9 June 1900 where the armistice was recalled. It is interesting that Prinsloo who negotiated in July 1900 with the British forces regarding the surrender of conventional forces was also implicated by people like Hintrager and Kolbe in P. D. de Wet’s armistice. The version of Hintrager relied on comments from the citing state attorney, J.A.J. de Villiers. According to this De Villiers had objections against the appointment of Prinsloo as commander of the conventional forces and of one of the conventional military units. (De Bruin)

Lastly, it is necessary to refer to one of the meetings (krygsvergadering) reported by Brink. According to Brink, the state president made it clear that he was aware of the negotiations which occurred between the British forces and officers which took place at Ficksburg. Brink indicated that the officers were members of the Ficksburg kommando. For our consideration of Jan W Kok, it is instructive to remember that he joined the Ficksburg Commando when he joined the war effort on 5 May 1900. (De Bruin)

De Bruin writes that the state president had to contend with the resignations of key personnel from his government as well as the actions of officers who had in mind to undermine the Free States war effort. I would argue that it would have been better if the officers resigned from their military appointments and then they would have been free to negotiate with the English. The example I would have followed would be the actions of Vilonel, but it is clear that not everybody would agree with me on the point. I accept that. That the approach followed by the Fickeburg officers were widespread in the area of the Free State seems to be clear from the evidence.

De Bruin makes a very interesting comment that the state president had to throw everything in the struggle at the end of May and early June 1900 to prevent the ZAR from ceasing the war effort! I did not expect this and it will be interesting to know how widely known this was, especially amongst the officers. If they knew this and it was widely anticipated, it places negotiations with the British in a new light, not previously considered here.

Extracts from Jan W Kok’s Diary

From Jan W Kok’s POW Diary

Monday, 31 July 1900

We laid down our arms at the surrender of Gen Prinsloo to Gen Hunter. Namely Windburg, Ficksburg, Lybrand, Smithfield, Wepener and part of Betlehem. A time of new experiences and disappointments awaits. Irrespective of the fact that we laid down our arms, we were promised to retain our horses and private property, however, all our horses and a portion of our oxen and mules were confiscated. Every burger were issued with a horse, but these were so gaunt that they will not be able to rich Windburg.

10 Augustus 1900

All our fastest horses, some of our ox carts and wagons were taken while we were under the impression that we would return home from here, the largest group burgers are dispatch to Cape Town at 6:00 already and the experience of the Afrikaner is clearly witnessed as one of disdain (afsku) and sadness (smart).

22 September 1901

Gert van de Venter started a choir (Zingkoor) in hut 48. Ds Roux preached and taught katkisasie (bible study) in hut 63.

1 October 1901

Ds Roux said during katkisasie (bible study) that they were selfish to have surrendered and that they did so only because they felt sorry for their horses and wanted to go home.

3 January 1901

A school has been started and they are encouraged to attend.

7 January 1902

A missions prayer meeting is started as well as a missions class.

It is known that Paul Hendrik Roux, the DRC Minister from Senekal served time in Ceylon and I have no reason to doubt that Jan Kok speaks of the exact same man.

Devine Reasons for the War

In my estimation, cooperation with the enemy (to some degree, even if it is only not to get in their way), negotiations with them and choosing the best option for yourself is part and parcel of the true image of a Boer. History leaves me no alternative. There is, however, a position that developed where men (and woman) was prepared to take personal responsibility for events and dedicate the rest of their lives to prevent such a thing to ever happen again. This now directly brings me to Jan Kok.

It is reported that there was a belief among the young men at these camps that a reason for the war was that they did not do everything in their power to spread Christianity among the native African tribes. The war was seen as God’s judgment upon them for this failure. The picture I get of Jan is not of a man blaming England for a “land grab” to get control of the diamond and gold mines. I wonder if he saw these as the primary reasons for the War. It may very well have been the actual reasons for the war, but what I like about the “belief” that existed in the camp among some, if indeed Jan also saw a causal relationship between the lack of a missionary zeal towards the black African tribes and the Anglo-Boer War as is reported amongst some of his compatriots, that Jan chose to focus on something he could do something about!

Jan got heavily involved in missionary work even in the camp and would devote the rest of his life to it. On 7 January Jan mentions in his diary that there was a mission prayer meeting and he starts to attend a missions class. Upon Jan’s return to South Africa, he enrolled in the Missionary Seminary of the Dutch Reformed Church in Wellington.  Jan was confirmed in March 1906 in a mission church in Heilbron. Jan became one of the founders of the “Zuid-Afrikaansche Pennie Vereniging” on 1 June 1902. The goal of the organisation was to promote the missionary course and through this, to expand the Kingdom of God.

His grandson (my uncle), Ds. Jan Kok, wrote a dissertation when he completes his studies as a Dutch Reformed minister, about the development of a missionary zeal in the POW camps and indeed, many of the POW’s returned home to become missionaries. This was later published under the title “Sonderlinge Vrug” (Lit Special or Unusual Fruit). In my research, I found that this is not a minor work. It is one of the most often quoted works on the relationship between the Boer War and the missionary zeal that developed in the POW camps. It is fascinating that Oom Jan, the grandson of JW Kok, the great-grandson of another JW Kok who supported Missions actively is the author of such an influential book.

A Rift between Free State Burgers and Those from the ZAR (Transvaal)

What sets Jan apart from any of the discussions about cooperation with the English, for a variety of reasons, is that what we have is sincere remorse. Most of the examples given by Boje & Pretorius (2011) relates to material matters. In some way, collaborators with the English feared the material destruction of the country and believed that a more prosperous future would be secured in ending the war. The difference between General de Wet and his brother which I started to develop where General de Wet was driven by “heart” and his brother by “mind” is an apt characterisation of a conflict I see in most burgers.

Jan took the matter of heart and mind, however, in an entirely different way he was able to solve the duality by looking at the relationship with the black inhabitants of the land. I find this fascinating. His choices were consistent with his heart and mind at the same time!

I know that in Ceylon, the burghers from the Free State were, eventually separated from the ones from the Transvaal due to bitter disagreements among them. Jan Kok was held with the burghers from the Free State. What could have been the cause for such disagreements amongst the Boers? The Free State burgers were generally more loyal to the Cape Colony than the Transvaal Boers. Steyn had porobably as many English members in his cabinet as he had Boers. There is, however, something to add which is very close to my own heart, that I have not seen much of in the current discussion. It relates to differences in the treatment of black people between the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. It has been reported that the system of black indenture, which was nothing else than a perpetuation of slavery, was practised widely in the ZAR (Transvaal) and not in the Orange Free State. I do not want to make too much of this, but even if it is an undercurrent, it must be brought up. This brings into focus matters that were still simmering since the first Anglo Boer War.

Background to the First Anglo-Boer War

Below, photos of Jan W Kok. 1st Photo at the bottom from the left is Jan in front of his hut in the  Diyatalawa POW Camp on Ceylon. Jan is back row, 1st from the right.

The background to the 1880 war between the Transvaal and Britain is the 1877 annexation of the Transvaal by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the British Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal. Since 1852 the Boers living on to the north of the Vaal River were given a measure of independence under the Sand River Convention. This came to an end upon annexation and in 1880 and the Boers reacted against this by re-affirming their independence or at least that independence would be restored, resulting in the First Anglo-Boer War. (Slatyer, 2015) With his declaration, passive resistance against the English annexation changed to active resistance.

A truce was declared in March 1881. Britain agreed to Boer self-governance in the Transvaal under British suzerainty. The Boers accepted the Queen’s nominal rule and the British controlled the external relations of the Transvaal, including their African affairs and native districts.  (Slatyer, 2015)

The Case for War

An article appeared in The Times (London, Greater London, England), 22 Feb 1881 that carries the response from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Earl of Kimberley, to a question from Earl Cadogan in the House of Lords. Despite the war being in full swing at this time, the debate in London sets out the case for the First Anglo-Boer War and is centred upon the treatment of black people.

It is in particular in response to questions in parliament by Earl Cadogan.  He wanted to know if there were any negotiations with the Boer republic of the Transvaal and if there is any truth to the reports that a Commissioner was to be appointed to carry on negotiations with the Boers following “overtones for peace” having been made by President Brand on behalf of the Transvaal. Following a brief reply to this question by the Earl of Kimberly, Lord Brabourne, in response to a publication in the Transvaal where a justification is given for the up-rise of the Boers, sets out to the council the motivations for war, in the face of calls from friends and supporters of the government to restore to the Boers, the freedom that was taken from them when the Transvaal was annexed in 1877.

A publication was circulating in the Transvaal, which based the Boers claims to independence on the Sand River Convention of 1852 and claimed that no provision or article has ever been broken.  The 1852, Sand River Convention was indeed the event that gave the Transvaal its independence from England in the first place.

The one article that was violated according to Lord Brabourne, is the provision related to slavery. This was then, according to him, the justification for the annexation of the region by British forces. The clauses in question stipulated that no slavery be practised in the country to the North of the Vaal River.

Lord Brabourne stated that there “could be no doubt that the reason for the Boers trekking from the Cape in 1835 (a year before the emancipation of the slaves) was the abolition of slavery in British colonies.”  At that time the slave population in the Colony was estimated at more than 35 000 slaves valued at GBP1 200 000. “The emancipation was effected without due care that the compensation reached the hands of those who lost their property, and the Boers quieted the English colony partly, no doubt because they feared taxation, but mainly because they honestly considered that they had been badly treated by having their slaves taken away from them and because they wished to maintain the institution of slavery which they believed to represent the proper relations between the white man and the black.” The statement itself is one that makes one cringe to think that they are talking about people and that the Boers considered the emancipation of slaves to be equal to the loss of property! That they, the Boers felt ill-treated for not being adequately compensated and that there was no discussion about the slaves receiving compensation for what was done to them. Later, the farmers were given some compensation but they continued to feel that it was not enough.

He then states that much controversy has arisen on the question if the Boers had been guilty of slavery or not. The Boers themselves have denied the claim and evidence is therefore set forth.

Dr Livingston wrote to Sir John Packington on December 1852, concerning the tribes on the Limpopo river, among whom he had successfully laboured for eight years. He said:- “No portion of the country belonged to the Boers, but they made frequent attempts to induce the chief, Bachele, to prevent the English from passing him in their way north and because he refused to comply with this pelley a commando was sent against him by Mr. Pretorius which on the 30th of September last attacked and destroyed his town, killed 60 of his people and carried off upward of 200 woman and children.  They are bought and sold and I have myself seen and conversed with such, taken from other tribes and living as slaves in the house of the Boers.  One of Bachele’s children is among the number captured, and the Boer who owns him can, if necessary, point him out.”

He then quoted a Cape Argus article which stated that “the whole world may know it, for it is true, and investigation will only bring out the horrible detail that through the whole course of this Republic’s existence it has acted in contravention of the Sand River Treaty, and slavery has occurred not only here and there in isolated cases, but as an unbroken practice has been one of the peculiar institutions of the country, mixed up with all its social and political life.  It has been at the root of most of its wars; it has been carried on regularly even in the time of peace.”

“In 1868, the Duke of Buckingham writing to Mr Pretorius warned him that if the Boers continued to violate the anti-slavery article, Great Britain would hold herself discharged from her obligations under the Convention.”

“In 1875, Mr Southey, Lieutenant-Governor, writing from Kimberley, said that certain laws just passed by the Republic, “establish practically a state of quasi-slavery in direct conflict with the stipulations of the Convention of 1852.”

Writing in November 1876, the Acting Secretary of Native Affairs in Natal said:- Since the demonstration made by the forces Secocoeni against Steelpoort Fort a party of Boers felt it necessary to attack a kraal of friendly Caffres by night, succeeding in shooting four men and capturing six woman and 22 children.  The woman has been given to Caffres at Kruger’s post and the children distributed among the Boers to serve an apprenticeship, otherwise slavery.”

“Khame, a native chief, thus wrote to sir Henry Barkly in December 1876:- I write to you, Sir Henry, in order that your Queen may preserve for me my country, it being in her hands.  The Boers are coming into it, and I do not like them; their actions are bad among us Black people.  They are like money.  They sell us and our children. I ask Her Majesty to pity me, and to hear that which I write, quickly.”

He continues to give more evidence and then makes the following summary remarks namely that “the existence of this system of slavery, attendant as it is by indescribable atrocities of evil, is a notorious fact to all persons acquainted with the Transvaal Republic; that these so-called “destitute children” are bought and sold under the denomination of “black ivory”; that these evils were fully admitted by persons officially cognizant at a public meeting held in Potchefstroom in April 1868; and that the whole subject has been brought fully under the notice of the High Commissioner.”

He said that “the case with regards to the charge of slavery against the Transvaal Boers stood thus – that they, being interested parties, most strenuously denied it.  They had denied it over and over again, but they had never disproved the facts brought against them.  And if their lordships believe the disavowal of the Boers, could they believe the missionaries, the independent Press of South Africa, and a number of officials in the colonies writing home dispatches which they knew might be and would be scrutinized by the public eye? Could they disbelieve all the complaints of the native tribes or the solemn resolutions of the Legislature of one of their Colonies?  And not only must they disbelieve these, but they must be prepared to believe that the whole of these parties was for 25 years in a conspiracy to slander the Boers without any conceivable motive or reason why they should have formed a conspiracy.”

These were the reasons given for the first Anglo-Boer war in London. Of course, it is the English leaders in a way, justifying the war to the other leaders and the public and every salient fact related to a total picture of life in the Transvaal would not be included. Still, that there must have been a large body of truth behind what was described is unquestionable. If the continued treatment of black people in the Transvaal could have been part of the disagreement between the Boer POW’s in Ceylon, I have no direct evidence of this. Nor does it matter. The fact that many in the camps laid the blame for the Second Anglo Boer War at the feat of the attitude towards black people stands. It is a pity that they did not translate this into a political view and chose to deal with thoughts only on a spiritual level.

If one takes the events at the Brandwater basin as some sort of a referendum on the war, with the overwhelming majority voting against it, and a very small number choosing to continue fighting one can see how this by itself could be reason enough for bitter disagreement. I wonder if one could say that the rank-and-file soldier, the Boers of the Transvaal seemed to be more committed to the war than those from the Free State? It will be an interesting investigation.

The matter of the war being seen as Gods judgement upon the Boers for not having a more committed missionary zeal related to the Black Africans within the context of the reasons for the First Anglo Boer War related to the perpetuation of slavery, again within the context of the Free State Boers at least as far as Brandwater was concerned, showing far less appetite for war than their counterparts in the ZAR – it is not a stretch to see these matters as interrelated. In Jan W Kok we have at least one example of this!

Of course, it could have been a simple case that the hundreds of kilometres separating most Free State citizens from the Rand Gold mines and Kimberly’s diamond mines made them less enthusiastic to fight what was ostensibly someone else’s war. It was materially to their benefit NOT to continue with the war where, in the Transvaal, the opposite was true. No need to interject fancy theories of a different view of the Black population and a debate that took place in London of which the average Free Sate Boer possibly knew little about into a matter that can more simply be explained in other ways. Still, it all makes me wonder if, at least as a contributing cause in the disagreement between the Transvaal Burgers and the Free State was not the matter of the treatment of black people.

Relationships with Black People

It is alleged by some that overall missionary work in the 19th century was left in the hands of English-speaking churches in South Africa and the Boers had a negative attitude towards missions. Many Afrikaans people saw natives of Africa as descendants of Ham (Van der Vyver and Dirk Postma). Oom Jan dealt with this subject in great detail in his book, Sonderlinge Vrug. I am retaining this as a placeholder to return to as soon as I am able to get a copy and study it. There is however enough of this subject in other literature to retain this as an investigation for the future.

It makes the attitude of the Kok family towards missions and the black population all the more remarkable. Not only was JW Kok (Snr) known to be an active supporter of the missions, but two of his sons, among whom JW Kok is one would become missionaries and devote the rest of their lives to the cause.

Relationships with the English

I will venture to say that it was not just towards Black Africans that the Kok family showed a remarkable attitude in reaching out to them, there may be evidence that they also did not see the English as the arch enemy and the Anti-Christ as so often portrayed in the conventional Boer mythology. There is no evidence that they ever actively colluded with the English, just as there is no evidence that they vilified them.

I will be very interested to know if anybody from my Oupa Eben’s side of the family or Ouma Susan was ever held in a concentration camp or, ever had their farmstead burned down in the Scorched Earth policy of the English. My family can correct me in this matter.

As far as these farms are concerned, maybe Oom Jan can give me detail of who on the Kok side of the family inhered witch farm in the Windburg area. As far as I have the details of farms in the northern Free State where Ouma Susan came from, it is as follows: Stillehoogte was the farm of my grandparents, Oupa Eben and Ouma Susan. It belonged to Oom Piet Rademan and Ouma Santjie inherited it from her father.  My Ouma Susan Kok inherited the farm since she had the Rademan (Geldenhuys name – Susanna Maria).

Aunt Meraai (Oom Sybrand and Oom Michiel Straus’s mom) had inherited the farm Leeuspruit because she had her Grandmom Uys’ name and Leeuspruit belonged to  Oom Giel Uys.

My Oom Jan Kok remembers the farm Stillehoogte was a farm on its own and not part of Rooiwal. The other Rademan children also inherited land in this area. Oom Jan is also not sure if this was part of Rooiwal. Oom Freek got the farm Rosebank. Oom Attie got the farm Goudinie , Oom Lourence the farm Windhoek. All these could have been one farm because they border each other.

As far as war-time stories handed down through my grandmother is concerned, I remember her telling me on more than one occasion of English troops moving through the farm where she grew up and her mom being forced to provide a meal for the English officers. In an act of defiance, she used the headscarf of one of her maids, hanging behind the kitchen door to wipe the plates before she served the food. I have always wondered about that story. It could very well have been the general practice for such a demand being made on a Boer farm, or, it could have been the one exception that my grandmother remembered. As I have learned in this adventure, seemingly unimportant bits of information becomes very important as I learn more about this time. For now, I file this story as one to return to.

The one story that Oom Jan tells which speaks to the relationship between the English and the Afrikaans following the war is that when Oupa Eben was transferred to a Standard Bank branch in Natal, Ouma Susan’s family objected that they did not was their daughter to go so far to an English part of the country. There was, to be sure, no inherent love between them and the English, but for the Windburg part of the family, I have no story that tells about similar friction. Oom Jan can enlighten me at this point if he is aware of anything. The only concrete reference is that JW Kok senior was seen as a friend to all and I have no reason to think that this did not include English speaking people.

A Personal Journey as Opposed to an Academic Study

I am eager to solicit comments from other family members on my observations. I am not a historian or an expert on either the First or Second Anglo Boer War. I am trying to pull different family stories I heard over the years together and make sense of them in light of new evidence I discover of events at the Brandwater Basin, Jan’s surrender and what was very much part and particle of the general atmosphere in the Freestate with a strong drive towards peace and reconciliation as opposed to War. Family members are welcome to comment or add information.

Evaluation by Leon Kok

I sent Uncle Leon Kok some of my thoughts on the matter. His father, Johannes Willem (Johan) KOK is the oldest brother of my Oupa Eben Kok whose father was Jan W Kok. Uncle Leon is perfectly positioned to offer a first-hand evaluation of my observations. Where I am far removed from these events in terms of time, Leon is much closer and had a far more active involvement in recording political thought in his day by virtue of the positions he held as a journalist. He has been thinking about these matters for as long as I have been alive! He is further a skilled researcher and an accomplished historian.

As proof of his access to leading thinkers of the time, he told me that “he enjoyed good personal relations with several Cabinet members such as John Vorster, Nico Diederichs, Helgaard Muller, Ben Schoeman, Owen Horwood and others. He was also one of the four founders of The Citizen and wrote occasionally for Die Transvaler, thanks to his good friend and editor Carl Noffke. Equally, he had a very independent view on the former Rhodesia, having worked on the Rhodesian Financial Gazette and was later Editor of the Windhoek Advertiser. These naturally coloured his views on SA’s international relations. Ironically, however, he was fired in 1982 for having met with the Soviet Ambassador in London.” (Personal correspondence from Leon Kok. I changed the 1st person to 3rd)

Leon wrote, “I’m sympathetic to your view that several leading Boer leaders thrust themselves more politically (anti-British, anti-English) on their forces than has been actually realized and/or recorded. Conversely, I’m sure that there would also have been strong independent and humanistic tendencies within the general ranks. This became even more patent during the 1914 Rebellion and has been particularly amplified in Deneys Reitz’ works. Incidentally, heavily involved in Heilbron as a lawyer, he was a close friend of the family. I would venture to say that these were issues that ultimately split Afrikanerdom into the United Party (UP) and National Party (NP) camps.”

Uncle Leon says, “Your view of Oupa Kok (and indeed Ouma too) is very accurate in my view. Our family were solidly placed in the UP camp. There were no ways that you could reconcile the likes of Botha and Smuts with hardline nationalists such as Beyers, De la Rey, De Wet, Kemp and  Maritz, and perhaps even Steyn at one stage. Besides, Oupa and Ouma Kok trained as missionaries in Wellington (the Cape) and would have been manifestly under the liberal influence of the likes of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr who later played a big part in the recognition of Dutch and English as the official languages. He even sought to prevent the outbreak of the Boer War,  and castigated Rhodes, and, indeed never forgave him for his role.”

“When I was in high school, Ouma Susan was living with us and I remember discussions I had with her where I was very anti-Jan Smuts based on what I learned in school. Years later, as I started to discover the true state of affairs in the Union of South Africa and later in the Republic, I realised that I too would have been a supporter of Smuts and Botha.”

Uncle Leon continues that “in even later years the Koks’ (especially your Grandfather, My Dad and Uncle Tim) were vehemently anti-Nazi and anti-OB (Ossewa Brandwag). They weren’t necessarily pro-British or anti-German, despised the horrors of the Third Reich and related regimes. There was one member by marriage of our family who was the complete reverse. Even in the National Party, future Prime Minister JG Strijdom was vehemently anti-OB. Of course, other future PMs John Vorster and Piet Botha were the opposite.

Uncle Leon makes an important comment on questions I had about the marriage of Uncle Timo and Aunty Thelma. She was Englis and I found it at odds with a staunch, nationalistic view of Afrikanerdom. It occurred to me that if they were cast in the ultra-conservative, English-hating, Black-African domination mould of many typical Afrikaner Boers, such a marriage would have been impossible. If Jan’s views were in line with the ultra-conservative Afrikaner Boer views which I have by now well established was not the case, certainly, he would have frowned upon the marriage of one of his sons with an English lady – the English being responsible for the Anglo-Boer war and for sending his father to a POW camp in Ceylon.

Uncle Leon concurs when he says that “Tim and Thelma’s marriage was not political” and the fact that it was not is exactly the point I am making. One generation after the war and a Boer and an English lady can unite in marriage! Leon writes “they met in Johannesburg shortly after the war. It was simply a case of two personalities who found each other and remained committed for life. Very English, she grew up on the Rand. Her family were old-world mining folk and adored Tim. My parents’ Afrikaans/English marriage was arguably modestly political, but very much within UP parameters. My maternal great grandfather, Carl Ueckermann, was Paul Kruger’s State attorney, but post-the Boer War his family were pretty liberal and vehemently pro-Botha and Smuts.”

Leon himself is proof of the fact that many (possibly most and from my information, definitely Free State Afrikaners) were moderate in their Calvinism, moderate in their view towards the English and moderate in terms of the oppression of the black South Africans. The following remarks of Leon are perfectly in line with what I am discovering.

Leon writes, “My own politics have been pretty pro-Smuts to 1948; as a journalist almost exclusively at Afrikaanse Pers and still at Naspers, I have adopted a very independent view on the rationale, strengths and weaknesses of the National Party (1948-1994)

Uncle Leon is very much in the mould of a “balanced world view.” He was once accused by a family member of being too pro-General Hertzog, but he says that on his part, “that was simply an attempt to present a balanced view of Afrikaner history. He was a great man.” He tells me that “in the 1950s Oom Jan and my Mom took a lot of flak at School from hardline Afrikaner nationalists. “I respect them immensely for having stood their ground. Oom Jan will relate the same to you.”

The Republic and the Loss of Access to Lucrative Markets

Having researched the creation of the South African meat trade intensely, the immense contributions of both Smuts and especially Botha looms large in the annals of South African agriculture. I tracked the head-to-head competition of the newly formed Union of South Africa in 1910 with the rest of the Commonwealth member countries and the access to lucrative English and European markets that were very successfully driven by Botha. South Africa made significant inroads! (see the history of the bacon producer Eskort Ltd.)

The work done by Botha and Smuts were completely undone by the National Party when they came to power. I tracked those developments carefully. I continue to work internationally in the meat trade and in contrast to the attitude of the National Party who came to power and insisted on South Africa becoming a Republic and severed lucrative economic ties with England, I see how countries who had a different view of England and the commonwealth maintain access to some of those international markets to this day to the benefit of all its citizens. I am able to say to Uncle Leon and Oom Jan today that they were right to support Botha and Smuts and that one can count the economic cost of the emergence of the National Party to this day.

The voices who called for close cooperation with England were in the end right, as far as it secured a firm economic foundation for the country and all its citizens. I see the value in this from an agriculture perspective which is amplified the clearest when I evaluate the results of those valuable ties being broken after we became a Republic under the National Party leadership.

Jan Kok’s Flowers

This has been a reaching-back into history like none other. It is as if the story wants to talk to me and information keeps coming. This story about Jan Kok’s flowers, again relates to Jan W Kok only indirectly through his dad, also Johannes Willem Kok, born on 29 July 1848 in Swellendam (Robertson?) in the Cape Colony.

His dad, Johan Hendrik Christoffel Kock moved his family from Robertson to the Free State and settled in Windburg district on the farm Besterschrik, 5km north of Korannaberg. A fascinating link emerged between Besterschrik, Ladysmith and the Kok Family.

At the outbreak of the Second Anglo Boer War, JHC Kock was 73 and not eligible for military duty. We know that the Windburg Kommando did duty in Natal at the outbreak of the war and that JW Kok, the son of JHC Kock was the Kommandant of the Windburg Kommando. We later find him fighting on 18 February 1900 with Cronje at Paardenberg. I located his war diary at the War Museum in Bloemfontein and will update this as soon as I can get my hands on it (and Oom Jan can help me with the translation). If the letter we have that was sent from Ladysmith dated 10.12.1899 is from JW Kok and not his son with the same initials Jan (JW) Kok who only joined the war effort on 5 May 1900, then it means that Jan was in Ladysmith in December 1900.

From Klopper, et al (2010) in their work, A first record of a South African aloe, Aloe spectabilis, becoming naturalized elsewhere in the country, comes the following remarkable entry. The heading is South African aloe naturalized in South Africa. Klopper et al (2010) state that “an extensive naturalized population of Aloe spectabilis Reynolds, a KwaZulu-Natal species, occurs on the farm Bester Schrik (Besterskrik) in the Free State, 5 km north of the Korannaberg, with a single individual known from the Korannaberg itself (photo below from the farm). This population has an interesting history that dates back to the start of the Anglo Boer War when plants were brought back to Bester Schrik from the Ladysmith area in a cake tin in 1900. Three plants were planted on a koppie on the farm and have multiplied to more than 30,000 plants (Oliver, 1986; Eloff & Powrie, 1990).” (Klopper, 2010)

Besterskrik was the farm where JHC Kock lived at this point and where he passed away only on 24 November 1908. This places JHC Kock on the farm Besterskrik in 1900. We know that his son, Jan Kok was in Ladysmith in December 1899. This could only have been Jan Kok, or at the very least a brother or a child who may have been in Ladysmith with him who, fighting in Ladysmith as part of the Windburg Kommando, took a cake tin, filled it with three Aloe plants and brought it back to the farm of his dad (or grandfather), Besterskrik close to Koranaberg, 55km South-East of Windburg, on the way from Ladysmith. The letter Jan wrote home shows that he was in Ladysmith in December 1899 which meant that Jan Kok, a brother or also possibly a son brought it to his dad or grandfathers farm in 1900 on his way home and en route to Paardenberg.

When my Oom Jan returned from visiting his Kids for Christmas, he posted on Facebook, “My bromeliad het my met al sy mooiheid terugverwelkom.”

Below is not only the bromeliad in question but a selection of the rest of his flowers. Oom Jan has always been a lover of plants and I most certainly now see where he gets it from. Not war or a pandemic can prevent them from seeing the beauty in life!

An Newly Emerging View of Jan W Kok

Liefste Jan,

Oupa en Ouma wil jou net van harte geluk wens met jou verjaarsdag en ons hoop en bid dat daar nog baie verjaar dae op sal volg. Ons is so bly dat jy so fluks leer en ons wil jou net aanraai om so aan te hou, dan sal jy die harte van jou pappie en mammie laat lekker voel. Die Here se Woord sê as dit die mens aan wysheid ontbreek, dan moet hy dit van die Here vra,  wat altyd gewillig is, om dit te gee. Nou ja moet nooit vergeet om elke dag die Bybel te lees en te bid nie. Mag die Here jou elke dag’n soet en gehoorsame seun maak. Nie net by die huis nie, maar ook in die skool sodat jou skoolmaatjies kan sê, ja daar is ‘n seun wat uit ‘n Godsdienstige huis kom Ons stuur vir jou hierdie paar Sjielings om iets te koop. Hou maar lekker verjaarsdag.

Met groete van jou Ouma en Oupa

( ‘n Sjieling was in ons geld 10 sent)

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What we looked at above is not always a pretty picture. That was, after all the purpose of my investigation. Not just to re-tell the story of Jan as a family hero, but to see him in the context of the difficult decisions he had to make and the robust discussions he would have been a part of. In understanding the pressures he faced, it helped me to deal a bit differently with the pressures I face.

After all that I learned, what can I say about Jan Kok? In the first place, I learned that was the product of great parenting. In the notice of the death of his father, also with the initials JW Kok, the following is reported about him. Jan Kok’s dad did not only partook in the Basotho Wars as a young man but also the Anglo-Boer War. He was chosen as Kommandant for Windburg and Senekal and partook in the battles of Moderrivier and Magersfontein. He also fought at Paardenberg with Gen Cronje and was part of Cronje’s surrender. Upon surrender, he was sent to Green Point and was later held in Simons Town where he remained till the end of the war. A statement is made that two of his sons became missionaries. One was Jan W Kok who worked in Heilbron and the other son ministered in Knysna. The report says that “he was a great friend and supporter of the missions (zendingsaak) for which he had an open hand and a warm heart. He was a faithful supporter of the Government and those who knew him had great respect for him because of his humility and his love towards everybody. Jan was everybody’s friend and his door was always open to all.

This final picture seals the matter for me about Jan’s surrender at the Brandwater Basin. Based on the comments about his dad, I am convinced that Jan’s surrender was in keeping with the wishes of the leadership and not something that he, fortunately, had to work out for himself. He was 20 at the time! In keeping with the tradition he received from his father who was a respected Kommandant and a supporter of the Free State Government, Jan acted upon the instruction of his leadership on the day and surrendered. De Wet mentions his dad when he succeeded De la Ray (who was sent to Colesberg) in the command of the Transvaalers at Magersfontein. De Wet lists the Commandants who served under him and in that list appears the name of J. Kok of Windburg. De Wet fought with and knew Jan Kok’s father and I am sure, also knew Jan Kok personally. Not only is it unthinkable that anything else transpired or that anything else can be read into the events at the Brandwater Basin, but the historical facts and the testimony of people who knew the Kok-family personally speak to us across the vast open spaces of the Free State, that this is the only likely option.

When I did the transition chapters between my life as a transport rider and that of bacon curer in Chapter 05: Seeds of War and Chapter 06: Drums of Despair, I investigated the influence of religion on actions. On the side of the Boer, the British and the black African. I made the point that often times we create mythology to justify action or to cope with unspeakable suffering or as a way to get others to comply with our thinking. This mythology is transcribed into religious language and assimilated into the psyche of our culture or subculture. We get a glimpse of Christiaan de Wet’s religion in one of the few speeches that we have by him which he made on 28 July 1900 on the banks of the Vaal River. I translate from the Afrikaans:

“Brothers, everyone who comes to us must remain with us to the end. Faithful he must be, faithful and pure of conscious. If this is not enough motivation to persevere then I am compelled to tell you that there exists a proclamation that gives every deserter the death sentence. Once we will show mercy but not a second time. I will be the first to shoot a man like that down in cold blood. Whoever henceforth is not faithful, must be shot!” (De Wet, C, quoted in Afrikaans by Blake, 2016)

Christiaan De Wet saw participation in the Anglo Boer War as a matter of faith. Not to support the republican cause, and the military part of this cause, in particular, was in his view a sin. The punishment for sin is hell and he gives an interesting definition of hell. “I view the hell which the bible talks off as nothing else but pangs of conscience (gewetenskwelling, in this context, probably objections or faltering based on conscience). He believed that there was no forgiveness for joiners (people who not just surrendered, hensoppers, but people who aided the British; I actually believed he would have grouped both joiners and hensoppers in this statement) despite the fact that forgiveness is an important pillar of the Christian faith. He said that “we are all sinners, but with the sin of treachery, I would not be able to live with for one day.” (Blake, 2016) He not only believed this but acted on it in the most brutal terms.

It reminds me of the justification from the Bible which many Boers believed to be normative in terms of their relationship with the black inhabitants of the land. It is exemplified in the beliefs of the Voortrekker leader, Andries Pretorius of whom it is reported that one of his favourite scriptures was from the Old Testament, where Israel was commanded to either slay or enslave the surrounding nations.  To him, the natives were the people of the cities who were “far off,” and he believed he had the Divine command to enslave them.  His was the nation of God, the chosen, who would bring God’s light into a savage, godless land. According to this belief, the Boers had a God-given right to occupy the lands of these people.  They were to them the Hittites, the Amorites, the Canaanites, and the Perizzites, the Hivites, and the Jebusites whom the Lord had commanded to destroy. (Seeds of War)

This brings me to the foundational difference, the thinking which dictated action, which sets the Kok family apart from the hard-liners. It is not that they did not support the war. They did! There is a much deeper and fundamental issue at play in that I believe their position would have been if asked, that De Wet is wrong that joining the British or abandoning the war, even if you do not join the English (a hensopper) is an unpardonable sin. They would one hundred percent for certain have believed that Gods grace extends to the worst of sinners. As far as the view of black people is concerned, they would have abhorred the view that the black man is “far off”! They would most definitely have believed that “there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye is all one in Christ Jesus.” (Gal 3:28) Oom Jan has his grandfather, Jan W Kok’s Bible and I am sure that this verse would be highlighted! This sums up the key difference between the Kok family and some of the prevailing extreme positions during that time.

They would have treated people whom they differed from politically such as the joiners and the hensoppers with forgiveness and compassion. Instead of using and exploiting the black population, they reached out to them! They were moderate Boer’s and both Jan and his father loved their country, their family, their God and were good neighbours to all. They would not have harboured a grudge, not even against the British! I can see Jan in his children and his grandchildren. I see the same attitude and character in his great-grandchildren and now that our kids are in their 20’s, I see it in his great-great-grandchildren! Joretha, the eldest daughter of Oom Jan, with her family even immigrated to England. JW Kok (senior), Jan W Kok, grandfather of Oom Jan and Uncle Leon are excellent role models of the attitude and thinking, the diligence and commitment of JW Kok Senior and Junior! Their blood flows through our veins and their marrow are in our bones! The picture I get of Jan W Kok is one that I can relate to!  

Finally, Jan Kok taught me that no matter what I face, always make time to appreciate the sunset! To take what is beautiful from the soil and return with it to my family, waiting for me at home. There is so much in life that is evil and bad but also so much that is beautiful and good! Amidst the greatest challenges, I want to see the beauty of life, just like Jan!

Special Note of Thanks

A special note of thanks to Oom Jan who shared much information with me over many years. Thanks to Uncle Leon for his encouragement, advice and information.

Further Reading

Boer surrender at the Brandwater Basin by Chris Ash. I enjoy his “alternative view.” Much truth is spoken in an air of irreverence and I believe that many holy-cows related to Afrikaner and Boer identity should be sacrificed and re-considered. This certainly includes the popular view of the two Anglo-Boer Wars.