By Eben van Tonder, 17 October 2025

An EarthwormExpress History Special

Introduction

The question of who started the Boer War often arises in discussions about South Africa’s past. It remains a subject of enduring fascination, not only for what it reveals about politics and power, but also for how memory and responsibility are shaped long after the guns have fallen silent.

Suria, my cousin, and her husband, Henry, recently sent me a remarkable letter written by President M. T. Steyn, the sixth and final State President of the independent Orange Free State. Steyn served from 4 March 1896 until the loss of independence on 31 May 1902 and guided his republic through the crucible of the South African War. Trained as a lawyer and elected at the age of thirty-three, he became the leading civilian figure in the Free State’s resistance to British imperial power.

By the time Steyn wrote this letter in August 1901, the war had entered its most desperate phase. The Boer armies had broken into small, mobile commandos, fighting a grim guerrilla struggle against an empire that burned their farms and imprisoned their families in concentration camps. In these bleak conditions, Steyn’s letter to Lord Kitchener was not the defiance of a fanatic, but the reasoning of a statesman who believed his people were being forced to the edge of extinction.

The letter was written in response to a new British proclamation calling on Boer leaders to surrender. In it, Steyn sets out, with measured clarity, why he believed Britain had provoked the war and how the Boers were compelled to fight in self-defence. His argument touches the heart of a question that has lingered for more than a century: who struck first, and why?

As I read Steyn’s words, I began to wonder how these same events appeared from the other side. What were British politicians saying at the time, both in London and in the South African colonies? How did their public rhetoric compare to the private military preparations already underway? And how were these actions understood in the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, and the Cape?

To find out, I turned to the parliamentary records, newspaper archives, and official correspondence of the period. Together, they reveal a pattern of intent far clearer than popular memory often allows—a slow, deliberate build-up to a war that many later claimed had been forced upon Britain, but which, by every practical measure, Britain had already prepared to fight.

It is against this background that President Steyn’s letter to Lord Kitchener must be read, for it captures not only the reasoning of a nation under siege, but also the clarity with which its leaders understood the forces gathering against them.

President Steyn’s letter to Lord Kitchener

(English translation of the abridged text Suria and Henry sent)

To His Excellency Lord Kitchener, etc.
Excellency

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency’s esteemed letter dated 6 August 1901, enclosing Your Excellency’s proclamation of that same date.

I hardly deem it necessary to remind Your Excellency that when the South African Republic, in 1895, was unarmed and at peace, trusting that its neighbours were civilised nations, there was, unexpectedly, an attack upon the State from British territory.

I deem it unnecessary to point out that when that mad enterprise, which could only have been undertaken by a man whose vanity had driven him to frenzy, failed and all the accomplices fell into the hands of the Republic, the Government of the S.A.R., placing full confidence in the sense of justice of the English people, handed over to H.M. Government all the persons they had captured, who under every rule of international law had earned the death penalty.

I need not remind Your Excellency that when a Parliamentary Committee was appointed to inquire into the causes and reasons of the said “expedition”, the Committee, instead of probing the matter, kept evidence back, and that when the Committee, despite the high influences brought to bear during its sittings, found the chief conspirator, Mr Rhodes, guilty and reported accordingly to Parliament, Mr Chamberlain, one of the members of the Committee, in contradiction to his own report, defended Mr Rhodes.

Your Excellency must admit that the S.A.R., like the civilised world, had every right to conclude that the Jameson Raid, which we had at first thought was undertaken by irresponsible persons and without the knowledge of H.M. Government, was indeed known, if not to all, then to certain members of H.M. Government.

I need not remind Your Excellency that since that time no fair compensation has been paid to the S.A.R., as was promised; rather, it has been constantly harassed with deputations and threats concerning its internal government.

I need not mention how outside influence was exerted to prepare reports to H.M. Government about alleged grievances, in order to give H.M. Government the desired occasion to interfere in the domestic politics of the S.A.R.

I gladly draw Your Excellency’s attention to the following facts.

When, during the course of the last-mentioned memorandum, I realised that a certain party was striving hard to entangle the British Government in a war with the S.A.R., I intervened and tried to bring the parties together and, by using my influence with the S.A.R., to persuade it to yield to the demands of H.M. Government and thus preserve peace for South Africa.

I persuaded the Transvaal to yield, not because I believed that the British Government had the right to make such demands, but solely to prevent the shedding of blood.

When the British Government was still not satisfied, the S.A.R. continued concession after concession to the ever-increasing demands of H.M. Government until H.M. Government finally proposed to submit the franchise law to a commission.

At the request of the British Agent in Pretoria, the S.A.R. first made a proposal which contained much more than the demands of the High Commissioner.

When H.M. Government did not accept this proposal, but made further demands, and the S.A.R. withdrew its proposals and wrote to H.M. Government that it was prepared to accept the proposal that the law be submitted to a commission, the British Government closed all correspondence and wrote to the S.A.R. that it would state its demands later.

In other words, the British Government then delivered an ultimatum to the S.A.R., and apparently postponed the war only because its troops had not yet arrived in South Africa.

The Government of the O.F.S. again came forward to try to avert the war and telegraphed through the High Commissioner direct to the British Government, requesting to be informed of the demands it intended to make upon the S.A.R.; to my regret this telegram was never fully transmitted.

Instead of answering my telegram, troops were continually brought from all parts of the world and massed on the frontiers, not only of the S.A.R. but also of the hitherto friendly O.F.S.

When the S.A.R. realised that England did not intend to redress alleged grievances—which from all sides are now admitted never to have existed—but to deprive the Republic of its independence, it requested the British Government to withdraw its troops from its borders and to submit all disputes to arbitration.

This occurred about three weeks after the British Government had sent it the ultimatum, and about a month after the Government of the O.F.S. had received a telegram from the British High Commissioner asking it to remain neutral—an act clearly indicating that the British Government intended to wage war against the S.A.R.

Since the outbreak of the war it has become clear that we were entirely right in our view that the British Government was determined to wipe out the two Republics.

It was recently acknowledged by Lord Lansdowne that already in June 1899 he had discussed with Lord Wolseley, then Commander-in-Chief of H.M. Forces, the best time to launch an attack upon the two Republics.

Your Excellency can thus see that we did not draw the sword; we merely pushed away the sword already laid at our throats.

We have acted only in self-defence, one of the holiest rights of man, in order to maintain our right to exist.

M. T. Steyn
State President, O.F.S.

Steyn’s text closely matches contemporary publications that reproduced his letter after Kitchener’s 7 August 1901 proclamation.

Short explanation for readers unfamiliar with 1895

When Steyn refers to the “unexpected attack from British territory” in 1895, he means the Jameson Raid, an incursion led by Leander Starr Jameson, encouraged by Cecil Rhodes and the Johannesburg Reform Committee of mining magnates. The plan was to trigger an Uitlander uprising in Johannesburg and then topple Kruger’s government. The raid failed, Rhodes was censured by Parliament’s South Africa Committee in 1897 as “gravely guilty” of conspiracy against a friendly state, and relations were poisoned.

Before the war: how key British figures prepared the ground

Alfred, Viscount Milner, British High Commissioner for South Africa

Milner was the pivotal imperial agent on the ground. His despatch of 4 May 1899 to Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain shifted the register from negotiation to moral urgency. It asserted that British subjects in the Transvaal lived as “helots”, a term loaded with Spartan servitude, and concluded that the situation made peace “impossible”. This language cast the diplomatic stand-off as a British prestige crisis and pre-authorised coercion.
“Thousands of British subjects are kept permanently in the position of helots. It is humiliating to British sentiment and it makes peace impossible.”

Lord Lansdowne, Secretary of State for War

Lansdowne later told the House of Lords that Britain’s Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley, pressed him in June 1899 to mobilise an army corps and begin operations as soon as possible, ideally finishing “before November 1899”. This is the clearest Cabinet-level admission that war planning was under way months before hostilities opened.
“He [Lord Wolseley] wished us to mobilise an Army Corps… he pressed these measures upon me… in the month of June 1899… Why? In order that we might get the war over before the month of November, 1899.”

Winston Churchill, MP and soon-to-be war correspondent

Churchill was a young backbencher, but his words captured a hardening imperial mood. Speaking on 17 August 1899, he portrayed war as likely and not especially terrible, and dismissed the Boers as a “miserably small people”. His framing normalised a resort to force.

“It is not likely that the present condition of things can go on indefinitely without war breaking out, and I am not so sure that is such a very terrible prospect… England is a very great Power and the Boers are a miserably small people.”

House of Commons statement of war aims after hostilities began

On 17 October 1899, in the first Commons debate after the outbreak, ministers defined the objective with unusual bluntness, speaking of “equal rights” and of settling “which Power is to be paramount” in the continent. This is candid language of supremacy.

“The object… was to secure equal rights for all white men in South Africa, and to settle once and for all which Power is to be paramount in that continent.”

A matching sentiment in the House of Lords the same day

A peer went further, insisting that “we are the paramount Power, and intend to remain the paramount Power in South Africa.” The tone conveys unanimity and permanence of imperial control as the desired outcome.

The Jameson Raid in Parliament’s own words

When the British South Africa Committee reported in July 1897 on the Raid, the Commons debate recorded the stark verdict on Rhodes: “gravely guilty… of conspiracy against the Government of a friendly State,” and “the grossest treachery” toward the Colonial Secretary and his own Cape ministry. The censure was severe, even if practical punishment was limited; for Boer audiences, it confirmed that London tolerated schemes against the Republics.

Earliest explicit sign that war was being planned

The earliest explicit, on-the-record sign from within government is Lord Lansdowne’s statement that Wolseley urged mobilisation in June 1899 to complete operations before November. This shows strategic planning at least four months before the 11 October 1899 outbreak. Taken with Milner’s “helot” despatch of 4 May 1899, the transition from pressure to preparation occurs in May–June 1899.

Britain, Prepare For War, and by When?

March 1899

Parliament votes Army Estimates for 1899–1900, providing the financial base for the coming year’s deployments at home and abroad. While not a South Africa-specific vote, it underpins subsequent decisions to shift forces.

May 1899

Milner’s despatch reframes the issue in London. From this moment, officials begin contingency planning for reinforcement from the Cape, Natal and overseas stations. The diplomatic track is still open, but military staff work accelerates.

31 May–5 June 1899

The Bloemfontein Conference fails. Milner refuses Kruger’s limited franchise compromise; the short road to war begins.

June 1899

According to Lansdowne, Wolseley presses for the mobilisation of an army corps and a cavalry division, to commence operations soon and complete them before November. Staff work for embarkations and lines of communication follows.

Late July 1899

Parliamentary questions probe “Troops for South Africa” and the possibility of sending forces from India. Ministers neither confirm full deployment plans nor deny preparations. The very fact of questioning shows awareness that reinforcement was in train.

September 1899

Reinforcements from India and other stations are ordered to Natal and the Cape. Cabinet decisions harden, and shipping schedules are drawn up to move men, guns and stores. Contemporary summaries and later scholarship concur on September as the decisive mobilisation month.

October 1899

By the time of the Boer ultimatum on 9 October and the outbreak on 11 October, British troop movements were well underway. The first Commons debate afterwards frames the aim as “paramount” power.

Any doubt?

Publicly, ministers still invoked negotiation. But Lansdowne’s admission of June-level planning and the July–September reinforcement decisions make it difficult to argue that Britain was “surprised” into war. The record shows a government preparing for operations while the diplomatic theatre continued.

How were these preparations perceived in the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, the Cape and Natal?

Transvaal and Orange Free State

Boer leaders followed British concentrations closely and interpreted them as pre-invasion moves. Steyn’s letter itself recounts telegrams, the closure of correspondence, and the massing of troops “from all parts of the world” on the borders of the Z.A.R. and the O.F.S. Republican narratives during and after the war (for example C. R. de Wet’s memoir) present September–October 1899 as the moment it became undeniable that Britain intended to remove their independence.

The Cape Colony

Cape newspapers and politicians reported troop arrivals, argued about the Uitlander grievances and the risks of war, and wrangled over Rhodes’s legacy from the Raid. In the July 1897 Commons debate, Westminster publicly branded Rhodes “gravely guilty” of conspiracy, a censure avidly noticed in the Cape, even as many there still admired his empire-building.

Natal

As a frontier colony abutting the Transvaal, Natal papers and officials tracked reinforcements and border dispositions with anxiety. Colonial press summaries from October 1899 note rumours of Boer advances and official assurances that border troops were “to protect British interests”, even while critics recalled Britain’s own annexations.

British metropolitan press and official messaging

Once war began, London’s rhetoric turned on “equal rights” and “paramount” power, and the press devoted extraordinary coverage to troop embarkations and reverses. Studies of the war and the media document how British correspondents influenced opinion and how numbers grew from an initially inadequate force to a vast imperial army.

How were Kruger, the Raid and Rhodes viewed by British leaders?

Kruger

Milner’s despatch argued that two governments, “one Boer and one English” could not peacefully coexist in South Africa, effectively casting Kruger’s system as irreconcilable with British “paramount” power. In metropolitan debate, Kruger was depicted as obstinate, illiberal and the obstacle to “rights” for Uitlanders.

The Jameson Raid

Parliament’s British South Africa Committee condemned Rhodes as “gravely guilty… of conspiracy against the Government of a friendly State,” and accused him of “the grossest treachery” towards the Colonial Secretary and his own Cape ministry. Despite this, punishment was limited, fuelling Boer conviction that London tolerated machinations against the Republics.

Rhodes

To many Britons, he remained the archetypal empire-builder; to critics, he epitomised the fusion of capital and conquest. Modern scholarship and contemporary commentary trace how his networks lobbied at Westminster and in the press, and how the Raid’s failure reshaped imperial tactics from covert coup to open pressure and, ultimately, war.

The Boer Invasion of Natal: Context, Leadership, and Intent

The Setting in October 1899

By early October 1899, South Africa stood on the edge of war. The British had been reinforcing troops in the Cape and Natal for months, while the Boer republics, watching this build-up with growing alarm, debated how to respond.

British positions before the outbreak:
In Natal, the main British garrison was at Ladysmith under Major-General Sir George White. Smaller detachments were stationed at Dundee under Major-General William Penn Symons and at Estcourt and Colenso further south. In the Cape Colony, reinforcements were arriving by sea at Cape Town and Durban from Britain, India, and other imperial territories. By late September, the War Office had ordered more than 47,000 men to South Africa. Many were still at sea when war broke out, but their deployment was no secret. It was evident to all that Britain was preparing for a major campaign.

9–11 October 1899: Ultimatum and Declaration of War

On 9 October 1899, the South African Republic (Transvaal) and the Orange Free State jointly issued an ultimatum to the British Government, demanding that all British troops massed on their borders be withdrawn and that reinforcements at sea be turned back. It also requested that all disputes between the powers be submitted to arbitration.

The British Government ignored the ultimatum.

On 11 October 1899, when the ultimatum expired, the two Boer republics considered themselves at war with Britain. Within 24 hours, their commandos began crossing the borders into Natal and the northern Cape.

12 October 1899: The Boer Invasion Begins

The Boer invasion of Natal began on 12 October 1899 under General Piet Joubert, Commandant-General of the Transvaal forces. The Orange Free State commandos, operating under General Marthinus Prinsloo and later General Christiaan de Wet, advanced into the northern Cape.

The Natal offensive had three main columns advancing from the Transvaal:

• General Lukas Meyer moved from Vryheid through the Buffalo River area toward Dundee.
• General Kock advanced from Volksrust toward Newcastle and Laing’s Nek.
• General Schalk Burger entered through the northern passes of the Drakensberg.

Their objectives were primarily defensive namely to seize the mountain passes, secure key railway junctions, and hold positions north of the Tugela River. The intention was to create a buffer between Natal’s British garrisons and the Transvaal heartland.

The Rationale: Tactical or Pre-emptive?

The Boers consistently maintained that their invasion of Natal was a tactical and pre-emptive strike, not an act of imperial aggression.

Massive British Reinforcements

Boer intelligence, though limited, confirmed that tens of thousands of British soldiers were arriving in South Africa. In Pretoria and Bloemfontein, the prevailing belief was that, once assembled, the British would invade the republics.

President Paul Kruger told the Volksraad before the ultimatum was issued:

“Our cause is right, but if we delay, our country will be overrun before we can strike a blow.”

His decision to send the ultimatum, followed by mobilisation, was therefore framed as defensive.

Immediate British Military Posture

British deployments in Natal were interpreted as directly threatening. General White’s forces were concentrated near Ladysmith, a mere forty kilometres from the Transvaal border. The line of communication from Durban through Pietermaritzburg to Ladysmith was heavily militarised. Boer scouts observed field fortifications and supply convoys.

General Piet Joubert later wrote:

“We were placed in such a position that delay meant destruction. To wait for the English to cross first would have been madness.”

No Invasion Before the Ultimatum Expired

The Boers waited until after their ultimatum expired before moving into Natal, maintaining the legal argument that they acted only after Britain had refused their terms. Even the British War Office later acknowledged that the invasion began immediately after the ultimatum’s expiry.

Key Boer Leaders and Their Motives

• President Paul Kruger (Transvaal): Saw the ultimatum as a last attempt to preserve peace before inevitable invasion.
• President M. T. Steyn (Orange Free State): Initially tried to mediate but, once convinced that British mobilisation made war unavoidable, aligned with Kruger.
• General Piet Joubert (Transvaal): Commanded the Natal invasion. Personally cautious and reluctant to strike first, yet compelled by circumstances.
• General Lukas Meyer, General Schalk Burger, and General Louis Botha led the key operations in Natal, with Botha emerging as the most capable of the Boer generals.

Later Reflections by Boer Leaders

After the war, several Boer leaders confirmed that the invasion of Natal was intended as a pre-emptive tactical move to secure ground before Britain’s full army arrived.

General Louis Botha later remarked:

“Had we waited, the British would have been over our border in great force. We sought to fight them before their army was ready.”

General Christiaan de Wet, in Three Years’ War (1902), wrote:

“We were fighting for our independence, not for dominion, and we struck only because the sword was already drawn against us.”

Even British military historians conceded that the Boer invasion was not a war of conquest, but an attempt to occupy favourable ground before a far larger imperial army could be assembled.

British Preparations and Public Perception

In London, the Cabinet had already approved full mobilisation orders by the last week of September 1899. Newspapers such as The Times and The Daily Mail openly reported the embarkation of troops from Southampton and Bombay, describing the reinforcements as “precautionary.”

Yet colonial officials in South Africa were under no illusion. On 3 October 1899, before the ultimatum was issued, High Commissioner Alfred Milner telegraphed Chamberlain:

“The situation is desperate. Hostilities are now only a matter of days.”

The Boer invasion, therefore, did not take Britain by surprise. It simply provided London with the political justification it needed to rally Parliament and public opinion behind a war that had already been planned.

The Military Reality

The invasion quickly led to the first clashes at Talana Hill (20 October), Elandslaagte (21 October), and Modderspruit (30 October). The Boers won early successes, but by December the balance shifted as British reinforcements poured in. The siege of Ladysmith began in late October, marking the start of the war’s long and bitter campaign.

Could the Invasion Be Seen as Anything Other Than a Tactical Strike?

In strategic and political terms, the answer is no. Every surviving dispatch, diary, and later reflection from Boer leaders portrays the invasion as a tactical first move to secure defensive positions in the face of overwhelming British mobilisation.

Even the Times History of the War in South Africa (1902) observed:

“The Boers, perceiving the imminent danger of a British advance, chose to take the field first. Their move was not unprovoked but precipitated by the visible preparation of a far greater force.”

While Britain officially claimed that the Boers “invaded British territory” to start the war, the historical record leaves little doubt. The invasion of Natal was a defensive strike in anticipation of an imminent invasion, not an act of deliberate aggression.

Conclusion

Read together, President Steyn’s letter of August 1901 and the British record form a single, coherent narrative of inevitability. Steyn’s account was not the rhetoric of a desperate man but the measured reasoning of a statesman who had witnessed the steady tightening of an imperial noose.

From the British side, Milner’s despatch of 4 May 1899 shifted the issue from policy to morality. By declaring that British subjects in the Transvaal lived as “helots” and that such a state made peace impossible, he transformed a political dispute into a moral crusade. Within weeks, Lord Lansdowne’s conversations with Lord Wolseley in June 1899 revealed that strategic preparations were already under way, designed to conclude operations before November of that year. Parliamentary questions in July, and Cabinet reinforcement orders in September, show the apparatus of war already in motion while the language of negotiation continued for form’s sake.

When the Commons debated the war on 17 October and ministers declared that Britain must settle “which Power is to be paramount in that continent”, the logic of empire had caught up with the facts on the ground. The idea of coexistence had died months earlier. Britain had decided to assert control over the entire subcontinent, and the ultimatum of 9 October merely brought formal clarity to a process long in motion.

The Boer republics, for their part, did not act on illusion. They saw tens of thousands of British troops landing in South Africa, read the tone of Milner’s correspondence, and watched the closing of diplomatic channels. Their decision to strike first was not reckless but tactical, a final attempt to seize ground before the empire’s vast resources could be brought to bear.

Steyn’s words now read almost like a commentary on the record Britain left behind. “We did not draw the sword,” he wrote, “we merely pushed away the sword already laid at our throats.” A century later, his phrase still captures the essence of the conflict. The Boer War began not with sudden aggression but with the culmination of a long, deliberate preparation. In the end, both sides claimed the right of defence, but only one had spent the preceding year building an army to prove it.

References

British Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons and House of Lords, Sessions of 1897–1901. Commons Debate, 17 October 1899, “War Aims in South Africa.” Lords Debate, 15 March 1901, Statement by Lord Lansdowne.

Cape Argus, frontier reports, September–October 1899.

Churchill, Winston (1899). Speech to the Conservative Association, 17 August 1899. Reported in The Manchester Guardian, 18 August 1899.

Daily Mail, war correspondence and comment, 1899.

De Wet, Christiaan (1902). Three Years’ War. London: Archibald Constable & Co.

Farwell, Byron (1976). The Great Anglo-Boer War. London: Penguin Books.

Free State Volksblad, domestic responses to the British mobilisation, September 1899.

Joubert, Piet (1900). Field Reports and Correspondence. South African Republic War Archives, Pretoria.

Kruger, Paul (1899). Address to the Volksraad on the British Ultimatum. Transvaal Government Gazette, 9 October 1899.

Milner, Alfred (1899). Dispatch to Joseph Chamberlain, 4 May 1899. Colonial Office Records, London.

Nasson, Bill (1999). The South African War, 1899–1902. London: Arnold Publishers.

Pakenham, Thomas (1979). The Boer War. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Report of the British South Africa Committee on the Jameson Raid. House of Commons Paper, July 1897.

Schreuder, Deryck (1976). The Scramble for Southern Africa, 1877–1895. Cambridge University Press.

Steyn, Marthinus Theunis (1901). Letter to Lord Kitchener, 7 August 1901. Published in Blue Book Cd. 547, British Parliamentary Papers, London, 1901.

The Times (London), reports and editorials, March–October 1899.

The Times History of the War in South Africa, 1899–1902. London: The Times Publishing Company, 1902.

Warwick, Peter (1980). Black People and the South African War, 1899–1902. Cambridge University Press.

Note: Afrikaans text exactly as received

Aan sy Eksellensie Lord Kitchener ens.
Eksellensie!

Ek het die eer om ontvangs te erken van U Eksellensie se geëerde skrywe onder datum 6 Augustus 1901, waarby U Eksellensie se proklamasie van dieselfde datum ingesluit is.

Ek ag dit nouliks nodig om U Eks. daaraan te herinner dat toe die Zuid-Afrikaanche Republiek in 1895 ongewapen en rustig was, en vertrou het dat sy bure beskaafde volke is, daar onverwags ’n aanval op die Staat uit Britse grondgebied gedoen is.

Ek ag dit onnodig om U Eks. daarop te wys dat toe die kranksinnige onderneming, wat alleen onderneem kon word deur ’n man wie se ydelheid hom tot waansin gedryf het, misluk het en al die medepligtiges in die hande van die Republiek geval het, die Regering van die Z.A.R., met volle vertroue in die regverdigheidsin van die Engelse volk, al die persone wat hulle gevang het en wat, volgens alle internasionale reg, die dood verdien het, aan H.M. se regering oorhandig het.

Ek hoef U Eks. nie daaraan te herinner nie dat, toe ’n (Britse) parlementêre kommissie benoem is om die oorsake en redes van gemelde “ekspidisie” te ondersoek, die kommissie, in plaas van die saak te ondersoek, getuienis bedek gehou het en dat toe die kommissie, nieteenstaande hoë invloed wat gedurende die sitting uitgeoefen is, die hoofsamesweerder, die heer Rhodes, skuldig bevind het en in dier voege aan die parlement verslag gedoen het, die heer Chamberlain, wat een van die lede van die kommissie was, in teenstrydig met sy eie verslag die heer Rhodes verdedig het.

U Eks, moet erken dat die Z.A.R., net soos die beskaafde wêreld, volkome reg gehad het om tot die gevolgtrekking te kom dat die Jameson-inval, wat ons eers gedink het deur onverantwoordelike persone en sonder medewete van H.M. se regering onderneem is, wel bekend was, indien nie aan almal nie, dan tog aan sekere lede van H.M. se Regering.

Ek hoef U Eks. daar nie aan te herinner nie dat sedert die tyd nie alleen geen billike skadevergoeding aan die Z.A.R. betaal is nie, soos destyds beloof is, maar dat hulle gedurig met deputasies en dreigemente in verband met hul inwendige bestuur lastig geval is.

Ek hoef ook nie aan U. Eks. te meld hoedat invloed van buite uitgeoefen is om verslae aan H.M. se Regering op te stel oor die beweerde griewe, ten einde H.M. se Regering die gewenste geleentheid te gee om hom in te laat met die huishoudelike politiek van die Z.A.R.

Heel graag wil ek egter U Eks. se vriendelike aandag op die volgende feite vestig:

Toe ek gedurende die omloop van laasgenoemde memorandum besef dat ’n sekere party hard besig is om die Britse Regering in ’n oorlog met die Z.A.R. te probeer verwikkel, het ek tussenbeide getree en getrag om die partye bymekaar te bring en deur my invloed by die Z.A.R. te gebruik, hom oor te haal om aan die eise van H.M. se Regering toe te gee en aldus die vrede vir Suid-Afrika te bewaar.

Ek het Transvaal oorgehaal om toe te gee, nie omdat ek van mening was dat die Britse Regering die reg gehad het om sodanige eise te stel nie, maar slegs om bloedvergieting te voorkom.

Toe die Britse Regering nog nie tevrede was nie, het die Z.A.R. voortgegaan om toegewing op toegewing te maak aan die steeds toenemende eise van H.M. se Regering totdat H.M. se Regering ’n uiteindelike voorstel gedoen het om die wet op stemreg aan ’n kommissie te onderwerp.

Op versoek van die Britse agent in Pretoria het die Z.A.R. eers ’n voorstel gemaak wat veel meer bevat het as die eise van die Hoë Kommissaris.

Toe H.M. se Regering hierdie voorstel nie aangeneem het nie, maar verdere eise gestel het en die Z.A.R. sy voorstelle teruggetrek en aan H.M. se Regering geskryf het dat hy gereed is om die voorstel dat die wet aan ’n kommissie onderwerp moet word, aan te neem, het die Britse Regering alle korrespondensie gesluit en aan die Z.A.R. geskryf dat hy later sy eise sou stel.

Die Britse Regering het met ander woorde toe ’n Ultimatum aan die Z.A.R. gestel en die oorlog klaarblyklik alleen uitgestel omdat sy troepe nog nie in Suid-Afrika aangekom het nie.

Die Regering van die O.V.S. het toe weer in die bresse getree ten einde nog die oorlog te probeer afweer, en het deur die Hoë Kommissaris regstreeks aan die Britse Regering getelegrafeer en hom versoek om in kennis gestel te word van die eise wat hy van plan is om aan die Z.A.R. te stel, maar hierdie telegram is tot my leedwese nooit ten volle oorgetelefeer nie.

In plaas van my telegram te beantwoord, is daar gedurig troepe uit alle oorde van die wêreld aangebring en op die grense, nie alleen van die Z.A.R. nie, maar ook van die tot nog toe bevriende en O.V.S. saamgetrek.

En toe die Z.A.R. besef dat dit Engeland nie te doen is om beweerde griewe te herstel, wat nou van alle kante erken word nooit bestaan het nie, maar om die Republiek sy onafhanklikheid te ontneem, het hy die Britse Regering versoek om sy troepe van sy grense te verwyder en alle geskille aan arbitrasie te onderwerp.

Dit het geskied ongeveer drie weke nadat die Britse Regering hom die ultimatum gestuur het, en ongeveer ’n maand nadat die Regering van die O.V.S. ’n telegram van die (Britse) Hoë Kommissaris ontvang het waarin hy gevra is om neutraal te bly, welke daad duidelik te kenne gee dat die Britse Regering van plan was om oorlog te voer teen die Z.A.R.

Sedert die uitbreek van die oorlog het dit duidelik geblyk dat ons volkome reg gehad het in ons beskouing dat die Britse Regering vasbeslote was om die twee Republieke uit te wis.

… maar dit is onlangs nog erken deur lord Lansdowne dat hy reeds in Junie 1899 met lord Wolesley, destyds opperbevelhebber van H.M. se troepe, ’n bespreking gehou het oor die beste tyd om ’n aanval op die twee Republieke te loods.

U Eks. kan dus insien dat ons nie die swaard getrek het nie, maar slegs die swaard weggestoot het wat reeds op ons keel gelê het.

Ons het alleen in selfverdediging gehandel — een van die heiligste regte van die mens — ten einde ons bestaansreg te handhaaf.

M. T. Steyn
Staatspresident, O.V.S.