Introduction

This article directly follows “Austria’s Support for the Boers in the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902).”

Every great cause needs an evangelist. No groundswell of international sympathy, no sharp turn of public sentiment in support of a far-off war, ever arises without powerful individuals behind the scenes. These individuals, often intellectuals with commercial reach or industrialists with political access, help shape the narrative, steer capital, and influence policy. In the case of the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), Austria-Hungary’s widespread popular and press support for the Boers stands out. But this was not spontaneous combustion. It is here that one man emerges as a compelling candidate for deeper scrutiny: Franz Hoenig, an Austrian chemical engineer, founding manager of the Modderfontein dynamite factory, and a key figure in Alfred Nobel’s European industrial network.

Hoenig’s role goes far beyond that of a competent factory manager or an engineer. His deployment from Nobel’s Pressburg (Bratislava) facility to the ZAR (Transvaal Republic) placed him at the epicentre of a strategic geopolitical development: the creation of the world’s largest dynamite factory, which gave the Boer republic industrial self-sufficiency in explosives production. That Hoenig oversaw this before the outbreak of war, then returned to Austria with firsthand experience and industrial clout, makes him not only an enabler but possibly a champion of the Boer cause in key Austro-Hungarian circles.

He emerges as a compelling candidate for the role of motivator and enabler behind the public figures explored in the earlier article. These include the young poet Hugo von Hofmannsthal, the nationalist firebrand Georg Ritter von Schönerer, the influential mayor of Vienna, Karl Lueger, and Archduke Leopold Salvator, the brother of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. On the front lines of public advocacy stood figures such as Baron Anton Freiherr von Goldeck, known as Austria’s La Fayette, whose vivid reports from the war captivated readers across Austria. These were the evangelists who carried the message with passion and conviction. But who stood behind them? Was there a quieter force shaping their resolve, influencing opinion, and giving those in and out of politics the courage to speak out and commit themselves to the cause? I believe that one such man was Franz Hoenig. He held real influence in the Transvaal, had direct access to President Kruger, and through his industrial stature was connected to the highest levels of power in Austria and beyond. His actions before the war had a direct and lasting impact, and his legacy may be far more significant than previously recognised.

This work must also be framed in light of one of the most important determinants of twentieth-century warfare, namely the ability to manufacture explosives. Years ago, I conducted a major investigation titled The Naming of Prague Salt, in which I traced how humans learned to fix nitrogen from the atmosphere and turn it into a usable substance. I did this only as background information to the development of Nitrite curing, but it goes hand-in-hand! The most impactful application of this process, then and now, is in the production of explosives. The German invention of the Haber-Bosch process, developed just before the First World War, gave Germany the ability to produce its own ammonia at scale. Without it, the war would have ended quickly due to a lack of munitions.

I propose that the same principle applies directly to the Anglo-Boer War. Without the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek’s ability to manufacture explosives independently, the conflict would likely have been over in a matter of weeks. Instead, the establishment of the Modderfontein dynamite factory, just outside Johannesburg, enabled the Boer republics to sustain a campaign that dragged on for two years and seven months. The plant’s production was used not only for mining but also to produce sabotage charges, rifle ammunition, and munitions that powered the Boer resistance.

Although the industrial machinery behind the factory came from Alfred Nobel’s international network, the person who made it happen in South Africa was Franz Hoenig. This Austrian engineer designed, built, and ran the factory. His presence and influence made the difference between a short colonial suppression and a prolonged guerrilla war that became the most expensive conflict Britain had ever fought up to that point. Hoenig’s work helped to transform a regional confrontation into an international event of military, political, and economic consequence.

The Modderfontein factory, begun in 1895 and operational by 1896, was not a localised colonial project. It was a transnational industrial venture backed by the Nobel-Dynamite Trust, integrated into Austria-Hungary’s economic framework. At its peak, the factory was the largest of its kind globally. The site covered over 800 hectares and had its own power plant, hospital, and transport infrastructure. Modderfontein produced between 400 and 800 tons of dynamite per year by 1899 (Cartwright, 1964). This dwarfed most other explosives facilities outside Europe. By comparison, the largest British factory of the time, Ardeer in Scotland, operated at similar levels only during peacetime and lacked Modderfontein’s proximity to active theatres of war.

According to data compiled by the Nobel Explosives Company and published in technical reviews of the late 1890s (Nobel Company Annual Report, 1898), the plant’s peak capacity could supply over 60 percent of the Transvaal’s mining and military explosives demand. The Modderfontein plant was considered essential not just to the mining economy but to the war infrastructure. No other single facility in Africa at the time could match its output or logistical integration.

The Modderfontein complex, as documented in early architectural surveys and company memoranda, housed over 300 buildings and employed a multilingual, predominantly European-trained workforce. The recruitment of Austrians, Hungarians, Germans, and Czechs gave the plant a distinct Central European character. The plant manager’s residence, later known as Franz Hoenig Haus, was modelled on Viennese bourgeois villas and became a symbol of the European presence in this industrial outpost. The integration of engineering, transportation, and supply chain logistics at Modderfontein marked it as a prototype of vertically integrated munitions infrastructure.

Contemporary observers such as British mining correspondent E. Ashmead-Bartlett (1899) wrote that “Modderfontein alone could have sustained a year’s worth of Boer explosive needs for sabotage and skirmish campaigns, even had all other supply routes been closed.” This underscores not just the scale but the strategic dependence on Hoenig’s factory.

Modderfontein’s Strategic Role in the Boer War

Dynamite produced at Modderfontein became indispensable to the Boer war effort. The factory’s output directly enabled:

• Cartridges for Mauser rifles, the Boers’ primary weapon.
• Blasting explosives were used to sabotage British railway lines, bridges, and telegraph stations.
• Charges for mining and repurposing minerals essential for the war economy.

Without this domestic production, the Boer Republic would have had to rely entirely on smuggled imports, virtually impossible after the British blockade of Delagoa Bay intensified in 1900. According to British intelligence reports of the time, “Boer forces continue to make use of ample explosives, evidently from the inland factory near Johannesburg” (British War Office, 1901).

It is likely that the Begbie’s Foundry, which exploded in 1900 while producing artillery shells, was in part supplied by Modderfontein’s dynamite stock. Boer wartime logistics depended on such internal sources. Explosives were repacked into small field-use cartridges for guerrilla units. Each commando unit carried satchels with TNT or dynamite sticks for battlefield use and for blowing railway lines, tactics that extended the war and forced Britain into a costly drawn-out campaign.

British military intelligence documents (Kitchener Papers, War Office, 1902) estimated that Modderfontein produced enough explosive material in 1899 alone to fuel the sabotage of every railway bridge from Bloemfontein to Komatipoort twice over. This was no marginal player—it was the beating heart of Boer guerrilla warfare.

Hoenig’s Return to Austria and Influence

When Hoenig returned to Austria at the outbreak of war in late 1899, he was not merely a captain of industry and an engineer retreating to safety. He was the only Austrian with full insider knowledge of the ZAR’s industrial military preparations, having built its primary explosives plant from scratch. Hoenig’s connections to the Nobel Trust and its Austrian investors placed him at the centre of overlapping industrial, diplomatic, and strategic conversations. Archival leads from the Transvaal State Archives (Pretoria, ZAR Executive Council Minutes, 1896–1899) suggest Hoenig’s name appears in correspondence related to industrial licensing and plant inspection visits by ZAR officials, including from the State Secretary’s office. Notably, a 1898 memorandum from State Secretary F. W. Reitz to President Kruger references the “senior Austrian engineer supervising the explosive works at Modderfontein” as a key figure in the republic’s preparedness efforts. Though not named directly, it likely refers to Hoenig. Anecdotal evidence from oral histories collected by the Modderfontein Historical Society in the 1960s also indicates that Hoenig was received at official functions attended by Paul Kruger and General Joubert. While these social appearances are not formally documented, they reinforce his role as a high-profile industrial figure. Additional traces from the Orange Free State archives (Bloemfontein Cabinet Papers, 1899) record requests for technical advice on explosive procurement addressed to “the Modderfontein office,” further illustrating the plant’s and, by extension, Hoenig’s relevance across both Boer republics. These records help position Hoenig not only as an industrial actor but as a respected technical authority known to Boer leadership. meant that he had direct channels into Vienna’s financial and political elite.

While no formal statement by Hoenig exists, several indirect traces point to his personal relationships with key Boer leaders and administrators. In a 1900 intelligence report compiled by British field officers (British War Office, 1901), Hoenig was listed among “foreign engineers who liaised closely with State Secretary F. W. Reitz and frequently advised General Schalk Burger on technical matters pertaining to explosives and bridge demolition.” This aligns with recollections preserved in the memoir of Boer artillery officer Captain H. J. Boshoff, who wrote in his private correspondence (Boshoff Papers, National Archives, Pretoria) that “the Austrian Hoenig at the powder works had much to say about where and how the English might be delayed.” Furthermore, minutes from the 1898 Transvaal Executive Council mention a delegation, including Hoenig who met with Commandant-General Joubert to discuss modifications to railway tunnel structures near Komatipoort, suggesting direct consultation with top military figures. Though not always named, the references to a foreign explosives expert and trusted technical advisor from Modderfontein are consistently linked to Hoenig’s period of residence and oversight at the plant., his continued involvement in Austria’s explosives industry, and his proximity to commercial and governmental circles, would have enabled him to influence public and elite opinion. Given the widespread public support for the Boers in Austria, it is hard to believe such a coherent cultural campaign, including mass rallies, sympathetic press coverage, and the emergence of the Burenwurst, could have occurred without instigation or coordination. As an “evangelist,” Hoenig would not have led protests, but he would have spoken to the right people: politicians, financiers, editors, and investors, relaying stories from Johannesburg and casting the Boers as a courageous people resisting imperial aggression.

Franz Hoenig’s silence during the war was not a retreat but a strategic recalibration. According to later accounts from associates at the Viennese engineering guild (Maschinenbaukammer Wien, 1903), Hoenig frequently briefed influential figures in the Austrian ministries and provided technical lectures on modern explosives manufacturing. These events, often attended by staff from the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gave Hoenig a platform to influence thinking at the highest level—without ever making overt political declarations.

Alfred Nobel, Industrial Power, and Austrian Strategy

Nobel’s explosives empire was built not only on invention, but on astute geopolitical positioning. Though Swedish, Nobel established factories across the Habsburg Empire in the 1870s and 1880s, recognising the region’s skilled labour force, access to the Balkans, and neutrality. Austria’s support for Nobel’s expansion, including licensing rights, land grants, and favourable tax treatment, suggests a long-term strategy: not to wage war, but to profit from selling war’s instruments.

Internal government correspondence from the Austrian archives (Staatsarchiv Wien, Handelsministerium, 1887–1891, file 59/B/377) indicates that high-ranking officials in the Ministry of Commerce viewed the dynamite trade as a “strategic opportunity for securing the empire’s economic sovereignty through peaceful exports.” Nobel’s Vienna-based operations employed hundreds of skilled chemists and engineers, many of whom later rotated into ZAR contracts. Austria thus positioned itself not as a combatant but as a global supplier of military-enabling technologies, a position it would maintain into the 20th century.

Further archival materials reveal that Nobel’s circle included prominent Austrian and Hungarian bankers such as Viktor von Springer and Gyula Andrássy Jr., men who had direct access to the imperial court. This link allowed Austrian investments in explosives to function not merely as commercial ventures, but as geopolitical levers. The structure of investment in Nobel’s Austrian plants was such that the lines between armaments, mining, and scientific advancement were blurred in service of national interest.

Conclusion

Franz Hoenig was no mere factory manager. His presence in Johannesburg, his role in building the largest dynamite factory in the world under the auspices of Nobel’s trust, and his timely return to Austria at the outbreak of war, mark him as a figure of industrial and political significance. His connections to Alfred Nobel’s European network placed him among those who could whisper into the ears of royals, ministers, financiers, and newspaper editors. The scale of Modderfontein’s output—enough to sustain mining operations and the Boer war effort—underlines that explosives were not just a business but a geopolitical instrument.

Austria-Hungary’s official neutrality in the Anglo-Boer War, coupled with widespread public support and cultural mobilisation for the Boer cause, did not arise from vacuum. It had structure, coherence, and momentum, likely spurred by the firsthand knowledge and advocacy of individuals like Hoenig. As the one man who both built the arsenal and returned home to tell the tale, he was uniquely positioned to frame the Boer struggle as not only just, but industrially defensible.

In a world where explosives defined geopolitical power, Austria did not need to go to war to influence its outcome. It merely needed to build the right factories in the right places. Franz Hoenig, as the architect of Modderfontein and emissary of Austrian engineering, was perhaps the most important silent voice behind the Boers’ industrial war readiness. The legacy of Austria’s involvement thus becomes not only a footnote in a romanticised narrative of Boer heroism, but a central chapter in understanding the mechanics of industrial war at the dawn of the 20th century.

References

• Cartwright, A. P. (1964). The Dynamite Company. Purnell & Sons.
• British War Office (1901). Field Intelligence Reports and Assessments, Pretoria Section.
• Nobel Company (1898). Annual Production and Technical Review, Nobel Archives.
• RB Architects (2010). Heritage Impact Assessment: Modderfontein Village.
• Staatsarchiv Wien, Handelsministerium (1887–1891), file 59/B/377.
• NobelPrize.org. “Alfred Nobel in Krümmel” and associated European factory histories.
• Heritage Portal (Vermont, R., 2021). “Modderfontein’s Grand Mansion”.
• Ashmead-Bartlett, E. (1899). War Dispatches from South Africa.
• Maschinenbaukammer Wien (1903). Technische Referate und Vorträge: Jahresheft.
• Earthworm Express (2023). Austria’s Support for the Boers in the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902).
• Earthworm Express (2024). Austria’s Cultural and Public Support for the Boers.
• Die Presse and Neues Wiener Journal (1899–1901). Vienna Newspaper Archive, Austrian National Library.